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JOHN C. CALHOUN BECOMES THE TENTH 
JUSTICE: STATE SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL 
REVIEW, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AFrERJUNE 23, 1999 
DAVID MILTON WHALlN* 
The past several years have witnessed a five Justice majority of the 
Supreme Court enunciating increasingly severe limitations upon 
Congress' Article I powers. One effort by these five Justices has emar 
nated from a unique explication of the Eleventh Amendment which 
began with Seminole Tribe v. Florida in 1996 and was expanded 
by three tkcisions announced on June 23, 1999. This QJl.artet of dPr 
cisions has significantly limited congressional power. This doctrine, 
the author contends, represents a revival of the Calhounian 
nuUification doctrine which was a primary intellectual underpin-
ning of southern secession in the last century. Uustice Souter asserts 
that it is a revival of "industrial due process. "} The article examines 
the doctrine as explicated by Seminole Tribe and its progeny as it 
establishes severe limits on Congressional power, enunciates an 
I undefined doctrine of concurrent sovereignty between the states and 
the federal government, tkclares that the use of property is not within 
the ambit of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and reallocates the demarcation of the sepamtion of powers by tkclar-
ing that fetkral courts wiU not only ask what Congress did, but also 
* U.M. (Environmental Law), 1998, The George Washington University School of 
Law;J.D.; 1976, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville; BA., 1969, Duke 
University. Mr. Whalin previously held senior staff positions with the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives (1978-95) and is currently employed with the Social Security Administration. He 
also served as Assistant AttorneY General of Kentucky (1977-78), where he engaged in 
appellate practice in the Kentucky and Federal courts. The analysis and opinions ex-
pressed in this article are those only of the author and should not be attributed (directly, 
indirectly, or inferentially) to any other person or organization (including the Social Secu-
rity Administration) in the Executive Branch of the United States. This article is dedicated 
to the memory of Sharon Kaye (Cher) Brooks, 1947-1999,J.D. (1974), BA. (1970), Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, who fought against racial discrimination (the Ku Klux Klan 
burned a cross in her yard in North Carolina) and sexual discrimination and harassment, 
and fought for equal opportunity and economic security for all in our Nation. Cher made 
our land a better place during her journey here. A Pin Oak was planted in Cher's memory 
on the grounds of the U.S. Capitol on August 6, 1999. 
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why Congress did it, and whether Congress had sufficient eviden-
tiary support to do it. The article surveys the impact this Qp,artet of 
decisions may have upon environmental law Uy examining the im-
pact upon the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act, whether a 
state may be held liable as a potentially responsible party under 
CERCLA Uy a private party, whether there is a new basis to chair 
lenge the National Ambient Air Qp,ality Standards of the Clean Air 
Act, the implications for takings litigation, and the potential impact 
upon delegated authority and citizen suits. With the advent of the 
Calhounian Qp,artet, the article concludes, one is sailing upon un-
charted seas without a compass, much less a global positioning sys-
tem. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the 1998-99 term of the Supreme Court ended, the Court is-
sued three decisions1 amplifying its 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida.2 This Quartet of decisions redefined the boundaries of the 
Eleventh Amendment,S established a penumbral doctrine of state sov-
ereignty, and expanded the scope of judicial review of congressional 
enactments. The spirit of John C. Calhoun4 appeared to be hovering 
over the five Justice majority as they fleshed out a new Calhounian5 
1 SeeAlden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999); Florida Prepaid Post-
secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Permission to Litigate: &nJereign Immunity Lets States Decide ~ Can Sue Them, 
85 AB.A. J. 42 (1999); Marcia Coyle Be Harvey Berkman, Back to Antebellum Federal Relations, 
Say Some Critics of Rulings, NAT'L LJ . ,july 5, 1999, at AI. 
1517 u.s. 44, 76 (1996) [hereinafter Seminole 7Tibe llIJ. 
s See U.S. CoNST. amend. XI. "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed 
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id. 
4 See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 1774-1989, S. Doc. 
No. 100-34 (U.S. G.P.O. 1989) at 729. Mr. Calhoun, 1782-1850, a native of South Carolina, 
as well as a lawyer and graduate of Yale College, served as a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives (1811-17), a member of the U.S. Senate (1832-43 and 1845-50), Secr~ 
tary of War (1817-25), Secretary of State (1844-45), and Vice President (1825-32). See id. 
5 See JOHN NIVEN, JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE PRICE OF UNION 179 (1988). The 
"Nullification Doctrine" asserted that a state could nullify an act of Congress (or other 
federal intrusion) with which it disagreed and first came to prominence as a means of 
opposing the jacksonian "tariff of abominations." See id. Nat Turner's rebellion in 1831 
caused Calhoun to begin to assert this doctrine as a means of preserving slavery. See id. At 
the heart of this shift was a Southern "fear" that the industrialized North would insist on 
emancipation of the slaves and the creation of this "constitutional" doctrine was a means 
of preventing this from occurring from the federal level. See id. at 197. The Calhounian 
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doctrine which allows states to functionally nullify federally created 
remedies through the assertion of an Eleventh Amendment and/or 
sovereign immunity bar as well as establishing new parameters of judi-
cial review which rip asunder congressional prerogatives. 
This Article explores the impacts of the Quartet of decisions 
upon environmental law. First, the Quartet of decisions are examined. 
Next, the Article clarifies two threshold issues common to all of the 
environmental law implications of the decisions. Finally, the impact of 
this Calhounian Quartet upon various aspects of environmental law is 
explored. 
I. THE CALHOUNIAN QUARTET 
A. A Reverse in Course: Seminole Tribe v. Florida 
1. Background 
The Seminole Tribe of Florida, a federally recognized tribe 
headquartered in Florida, brought an action against the State of Flor-
ida and its Governor in U.S. District Court under the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act.6 The plaintiff also brought the action pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362.7 The defendants sought dismissal on the 
grounds that the action was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.s It 
was not disputed that the state had not consented to be sued.9 The 
court denied the motion,lO and an interlocutory appeal on this issue 
was taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.l1 
doctrine had at its heart the view that the Constitution was derived from the people but 
that the states as corporate bodies were the sole representatives of the people. See id. at 
196. The contrary position, expounded most notably by Senator Daniel Webster and Chief 
Justice Marshall, also viewed the people as sovereign but did not interpose the states be-
tween the people and the Constitution. See id. This contrary view, together with the Hamil-
tonian doctrine of implied powers, functioned to establish the federal government as the 
representative of the people. See id. at 196-97. 
6 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 656 
(S.D. Fla. 1992) [hereinafter Seminole Tribe 1]. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was en-
acted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause, which required good faith negotiations 
and authorized an action in federal court against a state to compel performance. See U.S. 
CoNST. art. I, § 8, d. 3; 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721; Seminole Tribe Ill, 517 U.S. at 51-52. 
7 See Seminole Tribe III, 517 U.S. at 51-52. 
8 See Seminole Tribe I, 801 F. Supp. at 657. 
9 See Seminole Tribe III, 517 U.S. at 55. 
10 See Seminole Tribe I, 801 F. Supp. at 663. 
11 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016,1020 (11th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Semi-
nole Tribe II] . 
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The court combined this case with one from Alabama,12 and 
found that although there was the requisite congressional intent to 
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity,lS Congress did not 
possess the power to abrogate based solely upon the Indian Com-
merce Clause.I4 The court also held that Congress had not acted pur-
suant to the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
finding that a protected liberty or property interest was not present.I5 
The court finally disallowed the action against the Governor under 
the doctrine of Ex parte Young. I6 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to consider the following two questions: 
(1) Does the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress from 
authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospec-
tive injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant 
to the Indian Commerce Clause?; and (2) Does the doctrine 
of Ex parte Young permit suits against a State's Governor for 
prospective injunctive relief to enforce the good-faith bar-
gaining requirement of the Act?I7 
2. The Majority Opinion 
Five Justices joined the majority opinion which was delivered by 
the Chief Justice.I8 The Court, citing Green v. Mansour,I9 first exam-
ined whether Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity applying the following two-part test: "first, whether 
Congress has 'unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the 
immunity,' ... ; and second, whether Congress has acted 'pursuant to 
a valid exercise of power .... "'20 Although the Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act did not expressly state an intent to abrogate, the fact that a 
state was the only defendant authorized by the statute was sufficient to 
meet the first part of the inquiry.21 
12 See itt. at 1018. 
13 See itt. at 1024. 
14 See itt. at 1028. 
15 See itt. at 1025. 
16 See Seminole Tribe!, at 1028-29 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908». The Ex 
parte Young doctrine is discussed separately in Section II. 
17 Seminole Tribe 111, 517 U.S. at 53. 
18 See itt. at 46. 
19 See itt. at 55 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985». 
20 [d. 
~1 See itt. at 57. 
l 
J 
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The Court stated that the focus was on the second part of the 
test: whether there was a '\1a1id exercise of power" by Congress.22 The 
Seminole Tribe asserted that finding a power to abrogate should be 
based upon the fact that prospective injunctive relief was being sought 
rather than monetary damages.2S This argument was rejected rather 
summarily by citing Cory v. ~ite,24 and Hess v. Port Authority Ttans-
Hudson Corp.,25 as being dispositive of the issue.26 The Court 
specifically stated that the type of relief sought was irrelevant to the 
second part of the test.27 Also unpersuasive was the Seminole Tribe's 
assertion that, because the statute granted states a power they did not 
possess (an ability to regulate Indian gaming in specified circum-
stances), the abrogation was justified as being the other side of the 
grant of power.28 The Court used the analogy provided by Atascadero 
State Hospital v. ScanlortJ.9 that the receipt of federal funds in and of 
itself did not establish consent to be sued and thus power to abro-
gate.so 
The Court specifically recognized that the Fourteenth Amend-
mentSl provided a basis for abrogation because Section 1 limited the 
powers of the states and Section 5 specifically provided Congress with 
enforcement authority.S2 Since the Seminole Tribe, however, did not 
assert that the statute in question was enacted pursuant to Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority did not consider this issue 
further." 
The focus of the Court's inquiry therefore was limited to whether 
Congress had authority to abrogate pursuant to the Indian Commerce 
Clause. 54 The Court began by stating that under the rationale of Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co. 55 there was no reason to distinguish between 
the Interstate Commerce ClauseS6 and the Indian Commerce 
22 Seminole Tribe In, 517 u.S. at 58 (citing Green, 474 u.S. at 68). 
tsSeeid. 
24 Seeid. (citing Coryv. White, 457 u.S. 85, 90 (1982». 
ts Seeid. (citing Hessv. Port Auth. Tran&-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,48 (1994». 
I6Seeid. 
27 See Seminole Tribe Ill, 517 u.S. at 58. 
28 See id. at 58-59. 
29 Seeid. (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 u.S. 234, 24&-47 (1985». 
M1Seeid. 
51 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
52 See Seminole Tribe Ill, 517 u.S. at 59. 
55 See id. at 60. 
54Seeid. 
35 Seeid. at 63 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989». 
!6U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, d. 3. 
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Clause.37 The Court viewed the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation 
upon the jurisdictional grant of power in Article III of the Constitu-
tion which could be abrogated by the Fourteenth Amendment.38 The 
question, then, was whether Union Gas provided a rationale for con-
gressional abrogation pursuant to powers elucidated in Article I of the 
Constitution without the additional authority of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.39 
The Court began by stating that Union Gas was an anomaly.40 The 
Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was adopted 
after the Eleventh Amendment, acted as a limitation upon the limita-
tion contained in the Eleventh Amendment and altered the pre-
existing balance between state and federal power.41 The Court then 
found that since the rationale of Union Gas was based solely upon 
congressional authority found in Article I, there was no authority to 
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in this 
instance.42 The majority continued to refer to Union Gas as a plurality 
decision and held that considerations of stare decisis were inapposite.43 
The Court then proceeded to explicitly overrule Union Gas.44 To 
state this holding rather simply, the Court held that the Eleventh 
Amendment modified all previously adopted provisions to the extent 
that they provide a basis for Congress to provide Article III remedies 
for private parties against a state. Put another way, the Eleventh 
Amendment trumps all previously adopted constitutional provisions 
within its purview. The Court appeared to endorse a state's ability to 
waive its immunity through participation in a legitimately regulated 
activity which was indistinguishable from that conducted in the pri-
vate sector as explicated in Parden v. Terminal Railway.45 The Court's 
holding was sweeping: even when Congress has exclusive authority 
over an area, this authority is restricted by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.46 In a footnote, the Court dismissed as "misleadingly over-
broad" Justice Stevens' concern that a right without a remedy was be-
37 See Seminole Tribe III, 517 U.S. at 63. The majority refers to the "plurality" opinion in 
Union Gas. See id. 
38 See id. at 65. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 65-66. 
42 See Seminole Tribe Ill, 517 U.S. at 66. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. 
4!l Seeid. (citing Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1964». 
46 See id. at 72. 
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ing created in the areas of bankruptcy, copyright, and antitrust. "47 
The action against the State of Florida was dismissed for lack of Arti-
cle III jurisdiction. 48 
The final issue before the Court was whether there was jurisdic-
tion to enforce the statute against the Governor notwithstanding the 
Eleventh Amendment.49 The Seminole Tribe was seeking prospective 
injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Younf!'O to end a "con-
tinuing violation of federal law" by requiring the Governor to negoti-
ate pursuant to the statute. 51 The Court found that, since the statutory 
remedial scheme was less stringent than that in Ex parte Young, there 
was no congressional intent to provide this remedy as demonstrated 
by the extensive remedial scheme in the statute at issue.52 The Ex parte 
Young remedy was unavailable notwithstanding the fact that the Court 
had just held the lesser congressional remedy unconstitutional. If a 
lesser remedy exists, Ex parte Youngis not available.53 
3. The Dissents 
Two dissents, one by Justice Stevens54 and the other by Justice 
Souter joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,55 vigorously took issue 
with the maJority decision. Justice Stevens found that there was cause 
for debate as to whether 
Congress has the power to ensure that such a cause of action 
may be enforced in federal court by a citizen of another 
State or a foreign citizen. There can be no serious debate, 
however, over whether Congress has the power to ensure 
that such a cause of action may be brought by a citizen of the 
State being sued.56 
47 See Seminole Tribe In, 517 u.s. at 72. 
48 See id. at 73. 
49 See id. 
50 209 u.s. 123 (1908). 
51 See Seminole Tribe Ill, 517 U.S. at 73. 
52 Seeid. at 75-76. 
53 See id. It is worth noting that the Seminole Tribe subsequently began conducting gaming 
operations. See Seminole Tribe II, 181 F.3d at 1239. Florida sued, but their claim was dis-
missed under a doctrine ofIndian sovereign immunity. See id. at 1245. Florida's contention 
of the Tribe's constructive waiver of its immunity was also unsuccessful. See id. at 1242-43. 
An Ex parte Young-type action was barred as was an implied cause of action. See id. at 1248-
49. 
54 See Seminole Tribe m, 517 U.S. at 76-100. 
55 See id. at 85-100. 
56 Id. at 78. 
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Mter an extensive examination of history and previous decisions, Jus-
tice Stevens stated that he would limit the Eleventh Amendment bar 
to its literal terms and find that Congress has the authority to make 
the federal courts available to remedy violations of federal law by a 
state or its officials.57 Justice Souter found the majority rationale to be 
"fundamentally mistaken" and examined the origins of the Eleventh 
Amendment at length.58 The gravamen of Souter's dissent was that 
the Eleventh Amendment "did not affect federal-question jurisdic-
tion. "59 Justice Souter concluded that the majority had abdicated its 
constitutional responsibilities. 60 
B. June 23, 1999, Round One: Alden v. Maine 
1. Background 
Mr. Alden and other probation officers employed by the State of 
Maine commenced an action in federal court pursuant to the Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)61 seeking overtime pay and prospective 
relief.62 The action was pending when Seminole Tribe was decided and 
the complaint was dismissed on the basis of that decision.63 Mr. Alden 
and the others filed a complaint in state court seeking the same relief 
pursuant to the FLSA.64 The action was dismissed as being barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment and an appeal was taken to the Supreme 
Judicial Court (SJC) of Maine.65 Maine's highest court found that 
Maine had not consented to be sued in its own courts by private par-
ties even when the claim "derives from federal law.''66 The Maine SJC 
further concluded that the Eleventh Amendment precluded Congress 
from making an un consenting state subject to suit in its own courts 
57 See id. at 98. 
58 Id. at 100. 
59 See Seminole Tribe III, 517 U.S. at 102. 
60 See id. at 185. 
61 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994). An 
aggrieved employee may bring an action against a state or private employer in either state 
or federal court to obtain back pay illegally withheld as well as prospective relief to prevent 
future violations. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The U.S. Department of Labor may also bring an 
action in federal court on behalf of aggrieved employees for back pay and prospective 
relief. See id. § 216(c). 
62 See Alden v. Maine, 715 A2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998) [hereinafter Alden 1]. 
6S See id.; Mills v. Maine, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9985, at *7 (D. Me. 
July 3, 1996), afJ'd, 118F.3d37 (lstCir.1997). 
64 See Alden 1,715 A2d at 172. 
6S See id. 
66 See id. at 174. 
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pursuant solely to Article I powers.67 The dissent would have found 
that there was a valid enactment under the Interstate Commerce and 
Supremacy Clauses.68 
2. The Majority Opinion 
Justice Kennedy's holding in the Court's m:yority opinion was 
uncomplicated: Congress does not have Article I power to subject 
nonconsenting states to suits for damages in state courts, and Maine 
had not consented in this instance.69 The specific constitutional basis 
for the holding, however, was ethereal, as exemplified by the follow-
ing excerpt: 
[T] he sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from 
nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. 
Rather, as the Constitution's structure, and its history, and 
the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear, 
the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the 
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification 
of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either lit-
erally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an 
equal footing with the other States) except as altered by the 
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amend-
ments.70 
The Court went on to state that this was implicitly confirmed by the 
Tenth Amendment.71 This state sovereignty was preserved in two ways: 
First, it reserves to them a substantial portion of the Na-
tion's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and es-
sential attributes inhering in that status. 
Second, even as to matters within the competence of the 
National Government, the constitutional design secures the 
founding generation's rejection of "the concept of a central 
government that would act upon and through the States" in 
favor of "a system in which the State and Federal Govern-
67 See id. at 175. 
68 See id. at 176-79 (interpreting U.S. CoNST. art. IV) . 
69 SeeAlden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) [hereinafter Alden II]. 
70 Id. at 2246-47. 
71 See id. at 2247. 
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ments would exercise concurrent authority over the people 
•••• "72 
The Eleventh Amendment did not "redefine" federal judicial power 
but only reconfirmed a state's sovereign immunity from suit without 
its consent.711 
The Court did not define the issue as the primacy of "substantive 
federal law," but rather as the implementation of a statute consistent 
with state sovereignty.74 The Court appeared to say that Congress may 
enact laws pursuant to one of the enumerated powers binding the 
states, but Congress cannot provide a means of enforcing any private 
rights created by such laws absent a state's consent. This creates a 
right without a private party remedy. This formulation, however, does 
not appear to limit the enforcement authority by the United States or 
by another state.75 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court examined several previous 
decisions76 and determined that the question of whether Congress has 
power to abrogate sovereign immunity within a state's courts was one 
of first impression.77 The Court found that a state's sovereign immu-
72Id. 
75 See id. at 225l. 
74 See Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2255-56. 
75 See id. at 2257. 
76 The Court asserted that Will u Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), 
stood for the proposition that 42 U .S.C. § 1983 did not create a cause of action against a 
state in that instance. See id. at 2257. Hilton u South Carolina Public Railways Commission, 502 
u.s. 197 (1991), was a stare decisis decision that found that states which entered the rail-
road business after the enactment of the statute at issue had impliedly consented to suit. 
See id. at 2257-58. The Court further explained that sovereign immunity was not raised in 
that case and was not authority to the contrary of this holding. See id. at 2258. Nevada v. 
Hal~ 440 U.S. 410 (1979), stands for the proposition that a state may subject another state 
to a suit for damages in that state's courts. See id. at 2258-59. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 
(1994), stands for the proposition that when a state appears to provide a post deprivation 
remedy for taxes collected in violation of federal law it cannot deny that remedy. See id. at 
2259 (Min this context, due process requires that State to provide the remedy it promised") . 
Implicit in this explanation is that a state does not have to provide any remedy and may 
use its sovereign immunity to bar a vindication of federal rights. Howlett u Rose, 496 U.S. 
356 (1990), holds that Ma state court could not refuse to hear a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 case 
against a school board on the basis of sovereign immunity" because the school board has 
no basis to assert this immunity since it was not an arm of the state. See id. at 2259-60. Ap-
parently it is permissible for Congress to commandeer a state's court for vindication of 
federal rights so long as the defendant is not a state. See id. This appears to be somewhat 
logically inconsistent with the Court's opinion. 
77 See id. at 2260. 
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nity within its own courts was absolute, save for the Ex parte Young8 
exception: 
The exception to our sovereign immunity doctrine recog-
nized in Ex parte Young is based in part on the premise that 
sovereign immunity bars relief against States and their 
officers in both state and federal courts, and that certain 
suits for declaratory or injunctive relief against state officers 
must therefore be permitted if the Constitution is to remain 
the supreme law ofthe land.79 
A congressional power to allow suits against a state in its own courts 
was found too offensive to the states.80 Congress thus has no power to 
abrogate immunity from suit by a private party against a state in its 
own courts.81 
The Court then asserted that this does not give a state a license to 
disregard '\raJ.id" federal law or the Constitution and propounded two 
limits on a state's sovereign immunity.82 The first limit involves a state 
that consents to be sued.8' By ratifying the Constitution, states have 
consented to be sued by other states and/or by the Federal Govern-
ment.84 For example, Congress may authorize suits by private parties 
against nonconsenting states pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, Section 5.85 The second limit is that suits are not barred against 
"lesser entities" such as municipal corporations or an entity which is 
not an "arm of the state. "86 Thus, some suits against state officers may 
not be barred.87 Money damages also may be available against a state 
officer so long as the funds do not come from the state's treasury.88 
78 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
79 Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2263. The "Doctrine" of Ex parte Young is discussed in Section 
II, infra. 
80 See id. at 2263-64. This is somewhat illogical in light of its approval of allowing Con-
gress to require a state's courts to hear federal question cases when the defendant is not 
the state. See id. at 2259-60. Again, it appears that it is permissible for Congress to com-
mandeer a state's courts for vindication of federal rights so long as the defendant is not a 
state. See id. This appears to be somewhat logically inconsistent with the majority opinion. 
81 See id. at 2266. 
82 See id. 
85 See id. at 2267. 
84 See Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2267. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. What constitutes a state or arm of the state is discussed at length in Section II. 
87 See id. This is discussed in Section II as part of Ex parte Young. 
88 See id. at 2267--68. The usefulness of this remedy is limited to the insurance policy carried. 
It may act to functionally preclude the affluent from holding state office. Will only the 
judgement-proof seek to hold office? 
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Finally, the Court appeared to leave open a potential challenge to 
a state's assertion of sovereign immunity on the basis of a denial of 
equal protection of the laws: 
[T] here is no evidence that the State has manipulated its 
immunity in a systematic fashion to discriminate against fed-
eral causes of action. To the extent Maine has chosen to con-
sent to certain classes of suits while maintaining its immunity 
from others, it has done no more than exercise a privilege of 
sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity from 
suit.89 
The m.yority opinion contained no guidance as to whether this asser-
tion has any practical substance. 
The Court maintained that it was not altering congressional 
authority to bind states by "substantive rules of federal law. ''90 Thus, it 
may be inferred that the FLSA's application to the states remains, but 
an aggrieved party has no individual remedy. The Court noted that 
the United States may still bring an enforcement action91 against a 
state for violating federal law, but this assertion ignores the practical, 
political reality that Executive Branch officials make political judge-
ments about whether to bring actions against states. If another state 
or the Executive Branch is unwilling to vindicate valid federal rights, 
there will clearly be rights without remedies. 
3. The Dissent 
In dissent, Justice Souter vigorously disputed the proposition that 
sovereign immunity existed beyond the explicit terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment:92 
This Court has swung back and forth with regrettable dis-
ruption on the enforceability of the FLSA against the States, 
but if the present majority had a defensible position one 
could at least accept its decision with an expectation of sta-
89 Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2268. 
90 See id. at 2269. 
91 See id. One group of commentators contends that congressional attempts to use the 
War Powers Clause to allow a private party to enforce a federal statutory right similar to 
this provision of the FLSA is barred by the Quartet. See Faculty, The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral's School, TJAGSA Practice Note; USERRA Note, ARMY LAw., Aug. 1999, at 52, 53 (Aug. 
1999). 
92 See Alden II, 119 S. Ct. at 2269-94. 
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bility ahead. As it is, any such expectation would be naive. 
The resemblance of today's state sovereign immunity to the 
Lochner era's industrial due process is striking. The Court 
began this century by imputing immutable constitutional 
status to a conception of economic self-reliance that was 
never true to industrial life and grew insistently fictional with 
the years, and the Court has chosen to close the century by 
conferring like status on a conception of state sovereign im-
munity that is true neither to history nor to the structure of 
the Constitution. I expect the Court's latest essay into im-
munity doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experi-
ment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as the 
other, as indefensible, and probably as fleeting.93 
205 
C. June 23, 1999, Round Two: College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board 
1. Background 
College Savings Bank marketed a patented deposit contract to 
satisfy future college expenses.94 In this action, College Savings Bank 
alleged violations of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act95 as well as the com-
mon law tort of unfair competition.96 Mter Seminole Tribe, Florida Pre-
paid moved to dismiss both complaints as being barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment.97 The district court found that the 1992 
congressional amendments contained an explicit abrogation of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity.98 The court also found that Florida Pre-
paid qualified to assert the Eleventh Amendment bar as an "arm of 
the state"99 and that Florida Prepaid had not "constructively waived" 
its immunity.1oo The second inquiry was whether the Lanham Act 
95 [d. at 2294-95. 
94 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 919 F. 
Supp. 756, 757 (D.NJ. 1996). 
95 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). 
96 See College Sav. Bank, 919 F. Supp. at 758. There was also a parallel action for patent 
infringement which is discussed in the next section. See id. at 757. 
97 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 
400,404 (D.NJ.1996) [hereinafter CollegeSav. BankIJ. 
98 See id. at 420-21. 
99 [d. at 413. The ~arm of the state" doctrine which the court examined at length was 
not an issue before the Supreme Court. This doctrine is discussed at length in Section II. 
100 [d. at 416. 
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amendments were enacted pursuant to the Section 5 enforcement 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.l°1 The court found that since 
there was no protected property interest at stake, there was no valid 
constitutional basis for congressional abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment.102 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed 
the lower court decision.103 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
consider whether there was a valid abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment, and also whether a state waives its immunity automati-
cally when it engages in post-enactment regulated activities.l°4 
2. The Majority Opinion 
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion105 for the same five Justices 
who composed the majority in Seminole Tribe and Alden and he recited 
the statutory provisions which explicitly abrogated not only Eleventh 
Amendment immunity but also any other doctrine of sovereign im-
munity.106 The Court first focused on whether there was a deprivation 
of property within the due process ambit of Section 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.107 The question was whether "(1) a right to be 
free from a business competitor's false advertising about its own 
product, and (2) a more generalized right to be secure in one's busi-
ness interests" was property under Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.10S The Court defined protected property as including 
"the right to exclude others. "109 The Court conceded that other provi-
sions of the Lanham Act-the trademark infringement provisions-
created protected property because of the right to exclude others 
from use.no The Court summarily found that the false advertising 
provisions at issue "bear no relationship to any right to exclude 
101 See id. at 426. 
102 See Colkge Sav. Bank l, 948 F. Supp. at 427-28. 
103 See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 
353 (3d Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Colkge Sav. Bank II]. The patent act part of the case pro-
ceeded on a separate appellate track and is the subject of the next decision to be dis-
cussed. 
104 College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
2219,2222 (1999) [hereinafter College Sav. Bank/II]. 
105 See Ul. 
106 See id. at 2224. 
107 See id. 
108 Id. 
109 Colkge Sav. Bank III, 119 S. Ct. at 2224. 
110 Seeid. 
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•••• "111 The Court also held that although business assets were pro-
tected property, the activity of doing business and making a profit 
were not business assets and thus were not protected property inter-
ests.112 
Since the Court found there was no valid abrogation of immunity 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it then turned to whether there 
was a voluntary waiver by Florida Prepaid.1l3 There was no question 
that Florida Prepaid had not expressly consented to be sued or that it 
had invoked the jurisdiction of the court.114 The gravamen of the is-
sue was whether by voluntarily engaging in an activity virtually indis-
tinguishable from private commercial activities and with the knowl-
edge of the strictures of the Lanham Act, Florida Prepaid had 
impliedly or constructively waived its immunity.ll5 The Court then ex-
amined what it characterized as the "constructive waiver doctrine"1l6 
and expressly overruled it.m The Court also examined whether Con-
gress may validly condition a state's participation in proprietary or 
market activities upon waiving its sovereign immunity.118 The Court 
did not find apposite the "market participation" decisions pursuant to 
the dormant commerce clause doctrine.119 The Court stated that 
conditioning the approval of an interstate compact upon a waiver of 
immunity was permissible.120 It also found permissible the condition-
111 Id. at 2224-25. Preventing false advertising prohibits a violator from intruding into 
one's ability to market a product and make a profit as well as preventing an intrusion into 
the general public's right to expend their funds without being deprived of their property 
by false advertising. Evidently, the deprivation of money by proscribed activity is not pro-
tected property. 
112 See id. at 2225. Apparently, the asset is protected property, but the use of the asset is 
not protected. If the use is not protected, then what value does the asset practically have? 
Wasn't this settled by the Statute of Uses in 1535? For a discussion of this Statute see, Av-
isheh Avini, Comment, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TuL. L. REv. 
1139,1140,1143-47 (1996). 
115 See College Sav. Bank m, 119 S. Ct. at 2226. 
114 See id. The Eighth Circuit held that submitting a proof of claim in a bankruptcy ac-
tion by a state entity constituted a valid waiver of sovereign immunity by invoking the juris-
diction of the court. See In re Michael S. Rose, No. 98-3440, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18481, 
at *12 (8th Cir. Aug. 9,1999). 
115 See College Sav. Bank III, 119 S. Ct. at 2226. 
116Id. (citing Parden v. Terminal R of Ala. Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964». 
117 See id. at 2228. 
118 See id. at 2226-28. 
119 Id. at 2228, 2230. 
120 See College Sav. Bank III, 119 S. Ct. at 2231. This was recently explicated in Entergy 
Arkansas, Inc. v. Nebraska, No. 98CV3411, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14643 (D. Neb. Sept. 22, 
1999), where the court found that the compact did not allow suits by private parties. The 
208 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:193 
ing of the receipt of funds upon agreeing to a waiver but included the 
qualification that the financial inducement, if sufficiently substantial, 
could become coercive to the point of being prohibited.121 The Court 
effectively proscribed implied or constructive waiver when it stated: 
In any event, we think where the constitutionally guaranteed 
protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the 
point of coercion is automatically passed-and the volun-
tariness of waiver destroyed-when what is attached to the 
refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise 
lawful activity.122 
3. The Dissents 
In a brief dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that goodwill, a widely 
recognized form of property, is the "substantive equivalent" of .. the 
activity of doing business or the activity of making a profit. "12S He 
went on: "A State's deliberate destruction of a going business is surely 
a deprivation of property within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause. "124 Justice Stevens also recognized that the majority should 
have focused on whether there was a reasonable basis to abrogate to 
prevent violations of the law rather than creating what was in effect a 
presumption of congressional invalidity.U5 
Justice Breyer, joined by all the dissenters, argued that it was 
permissible for Congress to condition a state's participation in a "fed-
erally regulated activity" upon waiving its immunity from private suit 
in federal courts.126 He asserted that Seminole Tribe and its progeny 
compact, however, explicitly allowed suits against Nebraska by the interstate entity. See in-
fra, note 172 and accompanying text. 
121 See CoIkge Sav. Bank III, 119 S. Ct. at 2231. 
122 Id. The impact was immediate. A case of major impact in the telecommunications 
field was dismissed and the Court's holding in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 119 S. Ct. 
721 (1999), of a few weeks prior was effectively rendered a nullity. SeeWlSConsin Bell, Inc. 
v. Public Servo Comm'n of Wis., No. S99-2061, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10884, at *5 (W.D. 
Wis. July 12,1999). 
125 See College Sav. Bank HI, 119 S. Ct. at 2234. 
124 See id. 
125 Seeid. 
126 See id. Although this article will subsequently discuss the impact of this quartet of 
decisions on environmental law, the implications in other areas should be obvious. States 
routinely participate in the interstate securities market by issuing and purchasing securi-
ties. Are they now immunized from being sued for fraud or other transgressions in the 
federal courts by private purchasers or sellers? If a state agrees to waive its immunity as part 
of an issuance of a security, may it subsequently withdraw that consent? Will a private party 
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threaten the ability to enact economic legislation vital to the realities 
of the twenty-first century.127 If Congress has the power to create "sub-
stantive rights," Breyer reasoned, it must also have the "subsidiary 
power" to create private remedies to enforce those rights.128 Justice 
Breyer specifically asserted that the ability to allow a private remedy 
against a state as a water polluter was now quite questionable.129 He 
surmised that Congress may need to create an "enforcement bureauc-
racy" or add conditions to the receipt of federal funds to accomplish 
the purpose.1W 
D. June 23, 1999, Round Three: Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank 
1. Background 
The background to this decision was partially described above. 
The district court found that Congress explicitly intended to abrogate 
a state's immunity under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection 
Remedy Clarification Act. lSI The question was whether the provision 
at issue was a protected property interest within the ambit of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,I!!2 and the court began with the unremark-
able assertions that a patent was propertyl!!!! and that the unlicensed 
use of a patent was a taking of property.l!!4 Florida Prepaid asserted 
that patent infringement was not within the ambit of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.1!15 The court, however, concluded that a patent was 
Fourteenth Amendment property and that Congress had the power 
pursuant to the Section 5 enforcement clause to waive a state's im-
munity for the purposes of a private remedy for patent infringe-
ment.1!16 The motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action was 
in such a transaction want to be limited to only being subject to the courts of the issuing 
state with all the dangers inherent in a locally elected (usually) judiciary? Will prudent 
purchasers of such securities demand an interest premium to cover the greater risk of 
having the federal courts' doors closed as well as that of a state's treasury? 
127 See id. at 2238. 
128 See Coll£g!l Sav. Bank m, 119 S. Ct. at 2238. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 2240. 
U1 See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 420 (D.N J. 1996) [hereinafter Coll£g!l Sav. Bank IJ. 
152 See Coll£g!l Sav. Bank 1, 948 F. Supp. at 422. 
15S See id. at 423. 
1M Seeid. 
155 Seeid. 
ISS See id. at 425-26. 
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barred by the Eleventh Amendment was denied.137 Mter the court of 
appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted Certiorari to determine if there was a valid enactment to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause,lll8 
2. The Majority Opinion 
The Chief Justice delivered the opinion for the same five Justice 
majority as the other three cases of the Quartet,l~9 There was no dis-
pute that Florida Prepaid had not expressly consented to be sued,l40 
and since College Savings had decided the issue of implied or construc-
tive consent, the sole issue was whether there was a valid congressional 
abrogation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.141 The Court 
found that Congress intended to explicitly abrogate pursuant to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.l42 
The Court stated that the test was whether the statute at issue was 
an "appropriate" means of enforcement under City of Boerne v. Flo-
res.14~ It found that "for Congress to invoke section five, it must iden-
tify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive 
provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or pre-
venting such conduct. "144 The offensive conduct was characterized as 
patent infringement by states and the use of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to bar remediation.145 The Court asserted that the legisla-
tive history did not reveal any pattern of patent infringement by the 
states.l46 It must be noted that the Court was not examining the legis-
lative history to determine the meaning of the statutory language 
(Le., legislative intent). Rather, the Court was examining the basis 
upon which Congress made the determination that a statute was 
needed to determine, in the Court's opinion, whether that basis was 
137 See College Sa'll. Bank 1, 948 F. Supp. at 428. 
138 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S. 
Ct. 2199, 2202 (1999). 
139 See ill. 
140 See id. at 2204. 
141 See id. at 2204-05. 
142 See id. at 2205. 
143 Flmida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 
(1997». It should be noted that the Court did not use any of the traditional Fourteenth 
Amendment analyses-i.e., strict scrutiny, rational basis, etc.-but instead used the "ap-
propriate" standard. See id. 
144 See ill. at 2207. 
145 See id. 
146 See id. at 2207-08. 
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"appropriate. "147 In other words, it was not inquiring into what Con-
gress did, but why it did it, a surprising and radical intrusion by the 
allegedly co-equal judicial branch into a core legislative function.148 
The Court asserted that "a State's infringement of a patent, 
through interfering with a patent owner's right to exclude others, 
does not by itself violate the Constitution."I49 The issue is whether a 
state provides either no remedy or inadequate remedies. l50 It found 
significant that Congress barely explored the adequacy of state reme-
dies.l5l Negligent conduct by a state which deprives a private party of 
property "does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. "152 Congress, the Court continued, had not limited the 
relief to only those situations where a state's remedies were inade-
quate.15S The Court concluded: 
The statute's apparent and more basic aims were to provide 
a uniform remedy for patent infringement and to place 
States on the same footing as private parties under the re-
gime. These are proper Article I concerns, but that Article 
does not give Congress the power to enact such legislation 
after Seminole Tribe.154 
3. The Dissent 
Justice Stevens delivered the dissent which was joined, again, by 
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.155 He noted that for 200 years 
147 See id. 
148 See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207-08. It is "clear" that this analysis will be applied 
to congressional Fourteenth Amendment enactments seeking to enforce Section 1 "due 
process" rights via its Section 5 authority, but does this presage a hunting license for the 
federal courts to question the basis of statutes and choices made by Congress enacted pur-
suant to Article I of the Constitution? Are the federal courts to replace the judgements 
made by Congress that a statute is necessary with a court's judgement that there is inade-
quate evidence of a need for congressional action or that the congressional choice be-
tween alternatives was inappropriately made? 
149 [d. at 2208. This appears to state that depriving one of a use of property is not a 
proscribed activity within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment under consideration. 
Seeid. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. at 2209. In footnote nine, the Court stated that in Florida an aggrieved party 
may seek payment from the legislature or a court action for "a takings or conversion 
claim." Seeid. n.9. 
152 [d. at 2210. 
153 See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2210. 
154 [d. at 2211. 
155 See id. 
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patent infringement issues had been the exclusive prerogative of the 
federal courts.I56 Mter examining the history of patent infringement 
and the constant congressional effort to insure national uniformity, 
the dissent concluded that it was appropriate for Congress to "close a 
potential loophole" and enact legislation to insure a national uniform 
scheme.I57 Mter examining the hearing records and other congres-
sional documents,I5S the dissent found a more than adequate factual 
basis for the legislation at issue.I59 
E. Qy,artet Conclusions 
This Quartet of decisions has significantly affected the under-
standing of the role of states within the Constitutional scheme.Ioo A 
state, or an arm of a state, is now immune from suit without its explicit 
consent unless Congress has explicitly abrogated a state's immunity 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The abrogation must be 
supported by evidence on the record which demonstrates extensive 
evil to be corrected. The courts will now scrutinize congressional ac-
tion to determine not only what Congress meant in a statute but also 
why it made the decision. There is now a residual state sovereignty 
beyond the reach of Congress except, perhaps, to remedy Fourteenth 
Amendment violations. The use of an asset to do business is not 
within the parameters of the Section 1 Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The remedy of Ex parte Young is not available 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts when Congress has 
prescribed an extensive remedial scheme even if that scheme is found 
to be unconstitutional. It appears that Congress cannot condition a 
state's participation in an activity upon its agreement to waive Elev-
enth Amendment immunity except for an interstate compact or upon 
receipt of federal funds, but the latter cannot be coercive. 
156 See ill. 
157Id. at 2212-13. 
158 See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2214-16. 
159 See ill. at 2219. 
160 See Mark Browning, States 3, Congtr!SS 0: Supreme Cuurt Cases Haoe Major Bankruptcy ImplicOr 
tions, 34 BCD NEWS & CoMMENT, July 26, 1999; Richard A. Kaplan, IP Issues Grab Supreme 
Court's Attention, CHICAGO DAILY LAw BUlL., July 26,1999, at 6; Keith B. Letourneau, The 
Tide Is Rising; State Pollution Prevention Regulations in Question, 'lEx. LAWYER, July 12, 1999, at 
31; Curt A. Levey, The Quiet Revolution: Conservatives Continue Federalism Resurgence by Ex-
panding State Immunity, LEGAL TIMES, July 12, 1999, at S23; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Supreme Court 
Errs on States Rights, N.Y.LJ., July 26, 1999, at 2; High Court Rulings May Slow Employment, 
Other Discrimination Suits, 2 H.R ON CAMPus, July 29, 1999. 
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II. THRESHOLD ISSUES 
This section explores certain issues that are common to the ex-
amination of the impact of these decisions on various aspects of envi-
ronmentallaw. These were not issues in the Quartet before the Court, 
but they appear to be integral to an understanding of the impact to 
be discussed in the next section. It is reasonable to assume that the 
Quartet did not alter, for the most part, current law in each of these 
areas. Where changes appear to have occurred, they are noted. 
A. State or Arm of the State 
In order to invoke the Quartet as a bar, the defendant must qual-
ify as a state or an arm of a state. None of the Quartet appear to have 
altered current judicial doctrine on this issue. Recent Supreme Court 
decisions generally have considered whether an entity established by 
an interstate compact is an arm of the state, but decisions in the lower 
federal courts have been more wide-ranging. 
1. Supreme Court Parameters 
There is little question that counties and municipal corporations 
are not within the ambit of the Eleventh Amendment.16I Examining 
whether a local school board was an arm of the state or more akin to a 
municipal corporation, the Court held that the answer depended in 
part upon the nature of the entity under a state's law.162 The Court 
considered several "significant" factors: that the school board was one 
of many similar entities; that it received a significant portion of money 
and some guidance from the state board of education; that the local 
school board, however, had "extensive" powers to issue bonds, albeit 
authorized by state law; and, that the school board could impose taxes 
authorized by state law but the decision to actually levy was the local 
board's.l63 Balancing all these factors, the Court held that the "school 
board was more like a city or a county than it [was] an arm of the 
state."I64 
161 Sa1Lincoln Countyv. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); Moorv. County of Alameda, 411 
U.S. 693, 717-21 (1973). 
162 See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). 
165 See id. 
164 See id. 
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Exercising a "slice of state power" is not sufficient to quality a 
governmental entity as an arm of a state.l65 The size of the "slice" is 
not specified, but being a direct liability of a state's treasury is consid-
ered very significant.I66 In the instance of an entity created by inter-
state compact, if the entity acts more like a county or municipality, 
then this factor weighs towards it not being an arm of the state.167 If 
the primary source of funds for an entity is local government, then it 
probably is not an arm of the state.l68 Landuse planning is tradition-
ally a local function and may be indicative that an entity is not an arm 
of the state.1OO The fact that a state cannot veto rules made by an en-
tity is also indicative that the entity is not an arm of the state.170 Fi-
nally, that a state is "forced" to sue an entity to impose its will, is also 
indicative that the entity is not an arm of the state.I7I 
Regarding the formation of an interstate compact, it appears that 
there must be an explicit intent to create an entity within the ambit of 
the arm of the state doctrine.172 The Court searches for such an intent 
through fact-specific inquiries. That a governor may veto the actions 
of members of an interstate body is not dispositive.173 Even the fact 
that the salaries and administrative expenses of the entities may come 
from the participating states if revenues are insufficient is not disposi-
tive174 when the states have provided no authority to pledge their 
credit, to draw upon tax revenue, to impose any charge upon either 
state, or to render either state subject to liability for any judgment 
rendered against the interstate entity.175 The fact that implementing 
legislation by the participating states does not refer to the interstate 
entity as a "state agency" also indicates that the entity is not an arm of 
165 Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 
(1979). 
166 See id. In this case, a state's treasury was not directly liable. See id. at 402. 
167 See id. at 401. 
168 See id. at 401-02. 
169 See id. at 402. 
170 See Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 402. 
171Id. 
17l! SeeHessv. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,43 (1994). The "other side" 
of this doctrine is whether an interstate compact-related entity possessing the authority to 
sue and be sued in federal court may sue a compact state notwithstanding the Eleventh 
Amendment. A court recently found that the Eleventh Amendment was not a bar under 
the terms of the compact at issue. See Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, No. 98-CV-3411, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14553, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 15, 1999). 
m See Hess, 513 U.S. at 37. 
174 See id. 
175 See id. at 37-38. 
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the state,176 but this is mitigated by repeated state court references to 
the entity as a state agency.!" Even if the entity's functions are those 
traditionally performed by both state and municipal governments, 
this does not resolve the issue simply because some of the functions 
are "state-like. "178 The significant factor in such a case, however, is the 
absence of state financial responsibility for the entity and the fact that 
for many years the entity has received no funds from either state.179 
Access to a state's treasury, it may be concluded, is a significant factor 
so long as that access is not discretionary. ISO Finally, the Court has 
recognized that a state's legal liability for judgements against a state 
university system is dispositive for Eleventh Amendment purposes, 
notwithstanding a liability insurance policy to indemnify a state's 
treasury. 181 
2. The Courts of Appeal 
The Second Circuit appears to have narrowed the ambit of the 
arm-of-the-state doctrine at least as far as public universities are con-
cerned.182 It has identified the two most important factors as "the ex-
tent to which the state would be responsible for satisfying any judge-
ment," and "the degree of supervision exercised by the state" over the 
entity.!83 The Second Circuit distinguished district court decisions that 
rested upon the obligation of the state to indemnify individuals 
affiliated with the entity from the issue of whether the state was re-
quired to satisfy any judgements against the entity.184 
The Third Circuit, considering whether the administrative and 
policy making functions of a district attorney qualify as an arm of the 
176Id. at 44-45. 
177 See id. at 45. 
178 Hess, 513 V.S. at 45. 
1'19 See id. 
180 In Auer v. Robbins, the Court found that the fact that a governor appointed four of 
the five members of the entity's governing board was not dispositive because a city, not the 
state, was financially liable and that, beyond the appointments, the state exercised no fur-
ther control. See 117 S. Ct. 905, 908 n.l (1997). This would appear to reinforce the impli-
cation that the liability of a state's treasury is the most significant factor to be considered, 
but this should not be overstated. See id. 
181 See Regents of the Vniv. of Cal. v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900, 904-05 (1997). 
182 See generally Pikulin v. City Vniv. of N.Y., No. 98-9236, 1999 V.S. App. LEXIS 9208 
(2d Cir. May 13,1999). 
183 Id. at *4. 
1M See id. at *5; see also Rosa R v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435, 437 (2d Cir. 1989), cere. denied, 
496 V.S. 941 (1990); Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
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state,185 explicated a three factor inquiry: "( 1) the source of the fund-
ing-i.e., whether payment of any judgement would come from a 
state's treasury, (2) the status of the agency/individual under state 
law, and (3) the degree of autonomy from state regulation. "186 The 
party asserting immunity as an arm of the state has the burden of es-
tablishing these factors.187 Whether a function is typically a state or a 
local function is part of the second-factor inquiry.188 The most impor-
tant factor is the liability of a state's treasury-as liability decreases it 
becomes less likely that an entity meets this factor.189 The second fac-
tor requires determining whether state law treats the entity as a surro-
gate of the state or as independent.190 It appears that discretionary 
decisions made by an entity pursuant to state law do not meet the sec-
ond factor.19l Considering the autonomy factor, the Third Circuit 
found that a limited ability of a state "after cumbersome proceedings" 
to supersede an entity was not sufficient.192 General supervisory con-
trol of a state appellate court over all who appear in court including 
the entity at issue was also insufficient to establish a lack of auton-
omy.195 The three factors are to be considered together when making 
a determination as to whether an entity has established itself as an 
arm of the state.lM Applying this balancing test, the Third Circuit held 
that in the instant case the office of the district attorney did not meet 
the test as an arm of the state.I95 
Considering whether a university and its governing board 
qualified as an arm of the state,l96 the Fifth Circuit propounded a six-
factor test: 
(1) whether the state statutes and case law characterize the 
agency as an arm of the state; (2) the source of the funds for 
the entity; (3) the degree of local autonomy the entity en-
joys; (4) whether the entity is concerned primarily with local, 
185 SeeCarterv. City of Philadelphia. 181 F.3d 339, 341-42 (3d Cir. 1999). 
186 [d. at 347. 
187 Seeid. 
186 Seeid. 
189 See id. at 348. 
190 See Carter, 181 F.3d at 348-49. 
191 See id. at 353. 
192 [d. at 353-54. 
195 See id. at 354. 
194 See id. at 354-55. 
195 See Carter, 181 F.3d at 355. 
196 See Richardson v. Southern Univ., 118 F.3d 450 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 u.s. 
1078 (1998). 
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as opposed to state-wide problems; (5) whether the entity 
has authority to sue and be sued in its own name; [and] (6) 
whether the entity has the right to hold and use property.I97 
217 
Mer examining each factor, the court found that the test was met, 
notwithstanding that the university did not meet factors five and Six.l98 
Subsequently, the court utilized the same six-factor test described 
abovel99 when it considered whether a state board regulating a profes-
sion was an arm of the state.200 The entity appeared to be part of the 
executive branch of the state.201 The board, however, was financially 
independent of the state's treasury.202 The board regulated an activity 
on a state-wide, rather than local, basis.205 Although the board 
adopted rules pursuant to state statutes, no part of the state had su-
pervisory authority over the content of those rules.2M The board's 
ability to sue and be sued was found to be quite limited and ambigu-
ous.205 The ability of the board to hold and use property was found to 
be too ambiguous to be helpful.206 The court found persuasive the 
broad grant of state power, the composition of board members who 
serve at the pleasure of the governor, and the board's state-wide juris-
diction in holding that the board was an arm of the state.207 
The Fifth Circuit also examined the same six factors and found 
that an expressway commission was not an arm of the state.208 The fact 
that at some future point the property could revert to the state was 
found to be inconsequential.209 The commission financed its own op-
erations and only received state funds for the retirement of revenue 
bonds which were not obligations of the state.210 There was no other 
197 Id. at 452. 
198 See id. at 456. The Fifth Circuit also held that "Congress has not expressly waived 
sovereign immunity for [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 suits." Id. at 453. 
199 See Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 139 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 
1998), em. denied, 119 S. Ct. 444 (1998). 
!GO See id. at 1034. The members of the board were also individually sued. See id. 
201 See id. at 1035. 
202 See id. at 1038. 
2OSSeeid. 
204 SeeEarks, 139 F.3d at 1038. 
2OIlSeeid. 
206 See id. at 1038-39. 
207 See id. at 1039. 
206 See Pendergrass v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Comm'n, 144 F.3d 342, 348 
(5th Cir.1998), em. denied, 119 S. Ct. 617 (1998). 
209 See id. at 347. 
110 See id. at 346. 
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activity which could be construed as imposing liability on the state.2l1 
There, the balance was found to be against finding this commission to 
be an arm of the state.212 The Sixth Circuit also recently considered 
this issue. In one case an eye bank sought to invoke immunity based 
upon its operation under state law.21S The court found it dispositive 
that the eye bank was a private nonprofit corporation and that the 
state had no financial involvement and that the state treasury had no 
liability for any judgement.214 
The Ninth Circuit has considered various iterations of this issue 
under a five-factor test:215 
[1] whether a money judgement would be satisfied out of 
state funds, [2] whether the entity performs central govern-
mental functions, [3] whether the entity may sue or be sued, 
[4] whether the entity has the power to take property in its 
own name or only the name of the state, and [5] the corpo-
rate status of the entity.216 
The district court only considered the first factor and the court found 
it sufficient in this case to hold that a university was an arm of the 
state.217 
Recently, the Tenth Circuit also reexamined the issue extensively 
and promulgated its own "rule. "218 First, the court concluded that a 
federal court may give deference to a state court rationale as to 
whether an entity is an arm of the state, but state court rulings are not 
dispositive.219 The court then set forth the factors to be considered: 
(1) state control of the entity;220 (2) designation under state law;221 (3) 
state court interpretations of its law;222 (4) fiscal independence (or 
lack thereof) from the state;22S and, (5) state treasury liability for any 
211 See ill. 
212 See ill. at 348. 
21S See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 173 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 1999). 
214 See ill. The court surveyed Marm of the state" decisions. See ill. at 560-61. 
215 SeeEl-Ramlyv. University of Haw., No. 98-15266, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 9782, at *7 
(9th Cir. May 18, 1999). 
216 Id. (quoting ITSI 1V Prod., Inc. v. Agricultural Ass'ns, 3 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 
1993». 
217 See ill. at *8. 
218 SeeDukev. GradyMun. Schs., 127 F.3d 972, 978 (10th Cir.1997). 
219 See ill. 
220 See ill. at 978-79. 
221 See ill. at 979-80. 
m See ill. at 980. 
as SeeDuke, 127 F.3d at 980. 
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judgements.224 These factors are to be weighed together with more 
weight given to the liability of a state's treasury.225 The Tenth Circuit 
also stated that it would raise the issue of an Eleventh Amendment bar 
sua sprmte because the issue went to the Article III power to adjudi-
cate.226 
The Tenth Circuit found that the entity was an arm of the state,227 
but then went on to find that, notwithstanding the fact that Utah had 
appeared in court and never raised the Eleventh Amendment bar, 
there was no waiver (i.e., consent) because there was nothing in the 
statutes of Utah indicating an express consent to be sued.228 This 
holding explicitly prevented officials of a state from making a policy 
decision to submit to the jurisdiction of the federal courts without es-
tablishing a basis for that decision either in the state's constitution or 
statutes.229 The court also found that while a county exists at the 
'\vhim" of the state, this is not sufficient to qualify it as an arm of the 
state.21lO 
B. The Ex parte Young Doctrine 
The Ex parte Young doctrine provides a means of obtaining pro-
spective relief notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment bar. The 
classic components of this doctrine have been stated as follows: 
First, federal courts have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit 
that seeks to require the state official to comply with state 
law-only allegations of federal law are sufficient .... 2S1 
Second, the doctrine will not go so far as to allow federal ju-
224 See itt. at 980-81. 
m See itt. at 981; accordElam Constr., Inc. v. Regional Transp. Dist.,129 F.3d 1343,1345 
(10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1363 (1998). 
D6 See¥-l Oil Co. v. Utah Dept. of Pub. Safety, 131 F.M 1415,1419-20 (10th Cir.1997). 
a'I See itt. at 1420 n.l. 
D8 See id. at 1421-22. The continued vitality of this decision is somewhat in doubt because the 
court recently held that if a state removes a case to federal court from state court, proceeds 
to litigate and then seeks to assert an Eleventh Amendment bar in oral argument before 
the Court of Appeals, a waiver will be found. See Sutton v. Utah St. Sch. for the Deaf Be 
Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1233-36 (lOth Cir. 1999). It is quite possible that this decision is 
based primarily upon the court's annoyance with the state and should be limited to its 
facts. See itt. 
129 See V-l Oil Co., 131 F.3d at 1421-22. 
130 See Robertson v. Morgan County, No. 97-1469, 1999 U.S.App. LEXIS 95, at *9-*11 
(lOth Cir.Jan. 6, 1999). 
U1ANRPipeline Co. v. Lafaver, 150 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. 
Ct. 904 (1999) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. Be Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 
(1984». 
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risdiction over a suit that seeks to address past wrongs-only 
ongoing violations are covered.2112 Third, the doctrine does 
not allow a federal court to declare past state conduct un-
constitutional when the only purpose for such a declaratory 
judgement would be its res judicata effect in a subsequent 
state-court proceeding; such a declaration would have the ef-
fect of adjudicating the liability issues in a damages action 
against the state even though a direct federal suit for dam-
ages would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment.21111 And 
fourth, although the doctrine will allow injunctive relief that 
might have some ancillary effect on a state treasury, it does 
not allow an award for monetary relief that is the practical 
equivalent of money damages, even if this relief is character-
ized as equitable.2M 
Seminole Tribe, discussed above, added a new qualification to this 
doctrine: if Congress enacts a statutory scheme more limited than this 
doctrine, then the statutory scheme prevails even if it is found uncon-
stitutional.2M Thus, when a taxpayer alleges that a state tax violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process clauses as 
a taking of property, the federal court door is closed because of the 
lesser remedy of the Tax Injunction Act.2M It further appears that 
when a specific federal statute (the lesser remedy) is found to be con-
stitutionally infirm as a result of College Savings, a more general federal 
statute is not available to provide jurisdiction.2117 
232Id. at 1189 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265,277-78 (1986». 
2SS Id. (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985». 
2M Id. (citing Edehnan v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974». 
2SS See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74-76 (1996); accurd ANR Pipeline, 150 
F.3d at 1189; Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Deptartment ofInterior, 160 F.3d 602, 609 
n.7 (lOth Cir. 1998)(dictwn), cert. denied sub nom. Salisbury v. Elephant Butte Irrigation 
Dist., 119 S. Ct. 1255 (1999). 
236 See ANR Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1191-92. The Tax Injunction Act is more formally 
known as follows: Act of Aug. 21, 1937, ch. 726, § 1 (1937) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 
(1937». Another court, however, permitted a suit for injunctive relief from an allegedly 
discriminatory tax to go forward although it did not consider the impact of the Tax In-
junction Act. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Board of Publ. Works of W. Va., 138 F.3d 537, 540, 
543 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 63 (1998). 
237 See Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. Public Servo Comm'n of Wis., No. S99-2061, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 10884, at *26-*27 (W.D. Wis.July 12,1999). In Waste ManagmwntHoldings, Inc. 
a Gilmme, the court held that Ex parte Young was available to challenge the validity of a 
statute which violated the dormant commerce clause. See No. Civ. A. 3:99-CV-425, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13508, at *14-*16, *19 (E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 1999). Ultimately, there was no 
statutory remedial scheme available, or at least it was not mentioned by this decision. See 
id. 
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The other additional qualification which closes the federal court 
door arises when the injunctive relief sought implicates special sover-
eignty interests.2s8 In this instance the issue concerned title to land.2s9 
In another case, a plaintiff sought to eliminate a public access road to 
Lake Michigan from a platted lot.240 In such a dispute, state law re-
quired joinder of the state because of laws governing access to naviga-
ble waters and public trust waters.241 An unconstitutional taking was 
part of the allegations in the complaint.242 The court found that the 
state's interests at issue implicated special sovereignty interests.24s The 
court also found that the state's interests were so inextricably bound 
into the complaint that the action could not proceed without the 
state's presence.244 Thus, the entire action was dismissed.245 A state's 
tax collection system also has been held to implicate a special sover-
eign interest.246 A state's property interest in future lease payments, 
however, has been found to be insufficient.247 A medical school's ad-
mission policy also does not implicate such interests.248 The unan-
swered question is whether Alden and the other cases decided on June 
23, 1999, have extended these attributes of special sovereignty,249 but 
the expansive language in these cases gives rise to the inference that it 
has widened. 
258 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997). 
259 See id. 
240 See MacDonald v. Village of Northport, 164 F.3d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1999). 
241 See id. at 968. 
242 See id. at 967. 
24S See id. at 972-73. 
244 See id. at 973. 
245 See MacDonald, 164 F.3d at 973. 
246 See ANR Pipeline, 150 F.3d at 1194. This court found two infirmities. See id. 
247 See Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Department of Interior, 160 F.3d 602, 612-13 
(10th Cir. 1998). 
248 See Buchwald v. University of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 495 n.6 (10th Cir. 
1998). 
249 Examinations of this issue post Seminole Tribe include: Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond 
Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REv. 407 (1999); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte 
Young, 72 N.Y.U.L. REv. 495 (1997); Vicki C. Jackson, Cauer d'Alene, Federal Courts and the 
Supremacy of Federal Law: The Competing Paradigms of Chief Justices MarshaU and Rhenquist, 15 
CoNST. COMMENTARY 301 (1998). 
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 
A. The jurisdictional Reach of the Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act (CWA)250 is the principal means of regulat-
ing the pollution of surface water nationwide. The CWA's jurisdic-
tional reach is determined by the definition of "navigable waters" as 
meaning "waters of the United States. "251 The principal decision in-
terpreting the meaning of this term is United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc.252 This decision stated that waters of the United States in-
cluded adjacent wetlands253 as well as waters within the ambit of the 
Commerce Clause.254 The expansive determination of the legislative 
intent of this term is regarded as dicta, because the land at issue was 
adjacent to a navigable waterway and the question was whether "wa-
ters of the United States" included the wetlands adjacent to this navi-
gable waterway.255 The expansive and somewhat vague language in the 
decision, however, has been subsequently interpreted to mean that 
waters not traditionally considered navigable-'\irtually all surface 
waters in the country"-are included within the definition.256 This 
may also be considered dicta because the holding concerned whether 
the CWA savings clause preserved certain state actions.257 It also may 
be asserted that this was not dicta because if the waters were not 
within the ambit of the CWA, the issue of preemption need not have 
been considered. The latter assertion is not entirely persuasive be-
cause the waterway at issue was Lake Champlain.258 There is very 
strong support, in any event, for the proposition that Congress in-
tended that any waterway draining into a navigable water, including 
adjacent wetlands, was within the statutory coverage of the CWA.259 
The Supreme Court, however, has not spoken to the issue of how far 
up the waterway chain Congress' constitutional authority exists. 
The question in light of the Quartet is whether Congress has the 
authority to extend jurisdiction as far as it did in the CWA. Is there a 
250 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
251 [d. § 1362 (7). 
252 See 474 U.S. 121, 121 (1985). 
253 See id. at 137-39. 
254 See id. at 133. 
255 See id. at 135, 137-39. 
256 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 (1987). 
257 See id. at 486, 498-99. 
258 See id. at 483-84. 
259 See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 137-39. 
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point where a water of the United States moves beyond the authority 
of Congress and becomes a sovereign part of the state? It should be 
remembered that Alden propounded a doctrine of "fundamental as-
pect[s] of ... sovereignty" that states had before the ratification of 
the Constitution and were not altered by that document or any 
amendments to it.260 The Court went on to explicate a system which 
reserved sovereignty to the states261 and propounded the system of 
concurrent jurisdiction.262 Alden placed a limit on the Commerce 
Clause power of Congress.26S The nature of that limit remains un-
clear.264 Is there some point where state sovereignty trumps congres-
sional authority? Is there a point where a nonnavigable tributary 
moves from being subject to congressional pre-eminence into a state's 
jurisdiction? It may be possible to infer from Coeur d'Alene that such a 
point exists. In Coeur d'Alene, the Court found that a state's jurisdic-
tion over submerged lands implicated an essential attribute of sover-
eignty.265 It is not much of a stretch to assert that at some point the 
dominant federal interest in nonnavigable waters ends and that of the 
states begins. If that line exists, where is it drawn? 
A second question is whether this new doctrine of state sover-
eignty will inhibit the power of the federal government to regulate 
ground water. Does this revived doctrine of state sovereignty preclude 
federal efforts to prevent the pollution of ground water? The implica-
tions of such a restriction upon the CWA should be obvious: prevent-
ing the application of the CWA to pollutants entering waters under 
state sovereignty would be a severe blow to environmental protection 
across the nation. 
B. Maya State Be Held Liable as a CERClA PotentiaUy Responsible Party Uy 
a Private Party? 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act (CERClA)266 provides that a state may be held liable 
to private parties in two circumstances: damages resulting from "gross 
2110 Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1999). 
261 Seeid. at 2247. 
IIltSeeid. 
265 See id. at 2256. 
I64Seeid. 
266 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997) (citing Utah Div. of State 
Landsv. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-98 (1987». 
!66 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation Be Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
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negligence or intentional misconduct" when attempting respond to 
an emergency or threatened release of a hazardous substance so long 
as the facility is not state owned,267and where a state is deemed to be 
an "owner or operator"268 or a person269 within the reach of CERClA 
liability.270 The statute specifically seeks to segregate those instances 
when a state is acting as a governmental entity (responding to an 
emergency or threat to public health and safety) and those instances 
when it is no different than a private party subject to liability.271 In the 
instance of citizens suits, a state retains its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity.272 For the purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that 
the state, or an arm of the state,2711 has not expressly consented to be 
sued and that it has raised a defense of the Eleventh Amendment as a 
bar to liability because the relief sought is money damages. 
The threshold question is whether there is an express intent of 
Congress to abrogate this immunity.274 Unlike the statutes at issue in 
College Savings and Florida Prepaid, there is no explicit intent to abro-
gate.275 As noted above, one section explicitly states that the Eleventh 
Amendment is not waived.276 Another section limits liability where the 
entity is exercising traditional state functions.277 The section at issue, 
where a state or arm of the state may be found liable as a potentially 
responsible party, explicitly seeks to make such entities liable but does 
not state that immunity is waived.278 This would appear to be 
sufficiently similar to the situation described in Seminole T'ribe 279 to 
meet the threshold question. 
The issue then becomes whether CERClA was enacted pursuant 
to a valid congressional power pursuant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which is the only basis available.280 The interest being asserted 
267 Ill. § 9607(d) (2). 
268 Ill. § 9601(20). 
269 See id. § 9601 (21). 
270 Seeid. § 9607 (a)-(m). 
2'11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 (d) (2),9601 (20) (D), 9601 (21). 
272 Ill. § 9659(a)(1). 
27$ See discussion supra Section II, A. 
274 See Seminole Tribev. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55-57 (1996). 
275 See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. 
Ct. 2219, 2226-27 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. 
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2205 (1999). 
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (a) (1) (1994). 
277 Seeid. §9607 (d) (2). 
278 See ill. § 9601 (20) (D). 
279 See Seminole Tribe II1, 517 U.S. at 55-57. 
280 See id. at 59. 
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is a federally<reated accrued cause of action. It is well established that 
a state<reated accrued cause of action is property within the ambit of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.281 A unanimous Court reaffirmed this 
principle as recently as 1996.282 The property which was sought to be 
protected in College Savings and Florida Prepaid was not characterized 
by the Court or the litigants as an accrued cause of action.2M It must 
be stated, however, that the decisions just cited concerned state-
created accrued causes of action.2M If the Supremacy Clause is to have 
any meaning, it follows that federally, statutorily created accrued 
causes of action are property within the ambit of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The first potentially pertinent part of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States. "285 There is recent evidence that this dormant clause may be 
receiving new life.286 Whether this presages bringing the protection of 
property within the ambit of this clause will be a cause for speculation 
and litigation. The more pertinent part is found in clause three which 
states: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. "287 A "person" includes natural per-
sons as well as the unnatural, such as corporations.288 CERClA, as was 
the case in College Savings and Florida Prepaid, vests exclusive original 
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States.289 A state's assertion of 
lISl See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-29 (1982); Pitts v. Unarco 
Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276, 279 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Pitts v. GAF Corp., 464 
U.S. 1003 (1983). 
ll82 See Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793, 804 (1996). 
ll85 The author has searched the record and can find no such characterization. It is not 
possible to cite a nullity. 
ll84 See Flurida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2207-08; Colkge Sau Bank HI, 119 S. Ct. at 2224-26. 
One somewhat recent decision held that a "legal cause of action" created by federallegisla-
tion was property within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, and is subject to just compensation. See Alliance of Descendants of Tex. Land Grants 
v. United States, 37 F.3d 1478, 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Cities Serv. Co. v. McGrath, 342 
U.S. 330, 335-36 (1952), and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 199,245 (1796». 
ll85 U.S. CoNST. amend XIV, § 1, d. 2. 
186 See Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (1999) (recognizing a constitutional right to 
travel in the Fourteenth Amendment). 
lIS7 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1, d. 3. 
186 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978), relu!aringde-
nied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978). 
ll89 SeeCERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9613(b) (1994). There has been almost no litigation on 
the meaning of this section-probably because the language is explicit and unambiguous. 
Cf. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1385 (5th Cir. 1989); Ameri-
226 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:193 
the Eleventh Amendment bar serves to deprive a private party of the 
accrued cause of action because no forum is open to the party. 
The Quartet decision most on point appears to be Florida Prepaid, 
where the Court held that a violation occurs "only where the State 
provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies .... " 290 Function-
ally, the statute at issue in Florida Prepaid was identical to the provision 
in CERCLA because the federal courts were vested with exclusive ju-
risdiction291 to remedy property deprivations by states.292 This should 
be the end of the inquiry, but the Court formulated a new inquiry 
into the basis of the congressional determination.295 Thus, it would be 
necessary to examine the congressional hearing records to determine 
whether states generated CERCLA-covered waste, and whether states 
asserted the Eleventh Amendment as a bar to recovery by private par-
ties. Given the extensive hearing record for CERCLA,294 the first part 
of the question should be easy to establish upon any reasonable inter-
pretation.295 It is difficult to imagine, however, how the hearing rec-
ords would be able to provide the evidentiary basis for the second 
part of the question just propounded. How can there be testimony 
that a state is asserting a bar to a statute which has not been enacted? 
It is improbable that it would be possible to overcome the hurdle set 
forth in Florida Prepaid.296 
Still, none of the Quartet prevents a suit by the United States. 
Indeed, Alden notes that the United States has the power to enforce 
the Fair Labor Standards Act against a state.29'7 CERCLA also vests en-
can Lifestyle Homes, Inc. v. United States 17 Cl. Ct. 711, 715 (1989); B.R. MacKay Be Sons, 
Inc. v. United States, 633 F. Supp.1290, 1296 (D. Utah 1986). 
290 See Flmida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. 
291 See id. at 2203. 
292 See id. at 2208. 
293 Seeid. at 2207 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997». The Court 
contends that it may determine if the legislative remedy, though facially within congres-
sional constitutional prerogatives, is proportionally congruent to the injury being pre--
vented. See id. 
294 Cf. David M. Whalin, Is There Still Pre-1980 CERCLA Liability After Eastern Enterprises', 
5 THEENVL. LAWYER 701,737 (1999). 
295 The author must question, however, whether there will be a reasonable interpreta-
tion given that the Court in Flurida Prepaid found an inadequate basis because there was 
insufficient evidence of patent infringement by the states. See 119 S. Ct. at 2207. 
296 See Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 962 F. Supp. 131, 133-35 
(N.D. Ind. 1997) (finding that such a claim was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and 
that there was no waiver by the state). CERCIA actions for response costs were found 
barred by the Second Circuit based on the Quartet in Burnette v. Carothers. See Nos. 98-
7835, -9003,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22277, at *1~*16 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1999). 
297 SeeAlden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2268 (1999). 
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forcement authority in the United States where a state engages in 
prohibited behavior.298 A private party seeking to hold liable under 
CERCIA an entity which can plead the Eleventh Amendment may 
utilize CERClA's Citizen Suit provisions299 by suing the United States 
to compel enforcement. Such an approach would have obvious short-
comings.lIOO 
C. Is There a New Basis to Challenge the Clean Air Act's National Ambient 
Air QJl,ality Standards? 
The Clean Air Act's (CAA)!IOI effectiveness is largely based on the 
process of setting national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS)!I02 
pursuant to CAA sections 108 and l09.!IOS In the development of the 
NAAQS, the effects of pollution on "public health or welfare" are the 
major considerations.!I04 Furthermore, the risk to ecosystems "may" be 
considered. !lOS The overriding consideration in setting the primary 
NAAQS is protecting public health after allowing for an adequate 
margin of safety.!I06 Secondary NAAQS standards are promulgated to 
protect the "public welfare. "!I07 
The setting of these standards is supposed to focus solely on pub-
lic health; economic and technical feasibility are irrelevant.!I08 The 
298 CERClA, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1994). 
299 Seeid. § 9659. 
:!GO The impact of Seminok Thbe upon CERCIA has been analyzed previously. See, e.g., 
FJ. Dindinger, II, Seminok Thbe's Impact on the Ability of Private Plaintiffs to Bring Environ-
mental Suits Against States in Federal Court, 75 DENV. U.L. REv. 253 (1997); Steven G. Davi-
son, Gooernmental Liability under CERCLA, 25 B.C. ENvn.. AFF. L. REv. 47, 66-70 (1997); 
Cheri Gochberg, Note, Environmental Enfurcement after Seminok Thbe u Florida, 17 J. LAND 
RESOURCES Be ENvn.. L. 343 (1997); Gregory J. Hauck, Note, Seminok Thbe u Florida: Has 
the Seminok Thbe Gambkd with Citizens' Rights to Sue Their State under CERCLA Y, 8 VILL. 
ENvn.. LJ. 479 (1997). 
SOl Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994). 
SO! SeegeneralEyARNOLD W. REITZE,JR., AmPoLLunoN LAw 4,54-67 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter REITZE]; if. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1613 (1995). 
sos 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409. 
S04 Id. § 7408(a) (1) (A), (a) (2). 
S05 Id. § 7408(g). 
:!OO Seeid. § 7409(b)(I). 
so7Id. § 7409(b)(2). 
sos See REITZE, supra note 302, at 54 (citing Lead Indust. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 
1148 (D.C. Cir. 1980), em. denied, 449 u.S. 1042 (1980»; American Petroleum Inst. v. Cos-
tle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub nom. American Petroleum Inst. v. 
Gorsuch, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982); see also American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 
1034, 1040-41 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
power); American Lung Ass'n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1998); NRDC v. EPA, 
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term welfare includes "effects on economic values"!109 but this has 
been held to refer only to the economic costs of pollution. S10 Con-
gress has therefore been seen to have made a deliberate choice to 
preclude any consideration of economic and technological feasibility 
in setting the NAAQS standards.m 
The CAA may now be open to challenge under the new review 
formulation set forth in Florida Prepaid. The preclusion of considera-
tion of economic or technological feasibility was a policy choice by 
Congress that was not subject to review because it was within its consti-
tutional powers under Article 1,512 The setting of the § 109m NAAQS 
standards are at the center of the CAA statutory scheme.Sl4 
In Florida Prepaid, the Court found that Congress acted pursuant 
to a valid constitutional basis, S15 but that the facts considered by Con-
gress were insufficient to support the policy choice made by Con-
gress.Sl6 It must be noted that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was the provision at issue.Sl7 The unanswered question is 
whether this presages a new requirement that a federal court must 
now examine the factual basis upon which a congressional policy 
choice was made pursuant to other constitutional congressional pow-
ers rather than the traditional inquiry into what Congress meant a 
statute to say, not why it said it.SlS Dicta in Florida Prepaid have created 
an inference that this may not be the "rule" for "proper Article I con-
cerns, "S19 but the question remains whether there should be any dif-
ferentiation in the method of constitutional review based upon the 
provision at issue. 
Assuming that there is a new rule, this means that a court. now 
has a license to examine whether, in its opinion, Congress had an 
adequate factual basis to exclude the consideration of economic im-
902 F.2d 962, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 
498 U.S. 1082 (1991). 
509 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h). 
510 See Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1148 n.36; Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 
1095,1118 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Costle, 446 U.S. 
952 (1980) 
311 See American Petroleum Inst., 665 F.2d at 1185; Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1149. 
512 See Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1150. 
515 42 U.S.C. § 7409. 
314 See REITZE, supra note 302, at 33-35. 
515 See Flmida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205-06. 
316 See ill. at 2210. 
317 See ill. 
518 Cf. Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1150. 
319 See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2211. 
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pacts and technological feasibility under CAA sections 108-109.!!2O In 
Florida Prepaid, the majority gave no consideration to the patent in-
fringement litigation engendered by the immunization from liability 
caused by Seminole Thbewhich was noted by the dissent.!!21 This implies 
that the only evidence a court will consider is the information utilized 
by Congress at the time it made its decision. It appears that this will 
consist of hearing records.!!22 Thus, if there is a new standard of re-
view, and logic provides no reason to differentiate between constitu-
tional provisions, the hearing records from the 1970 CAA will now be 
examined to determine if Congress made the "appropriate" choice, in 
the opinion of the unelected federal judiciary, when it decided to ex-
clude economic and technological feasibility from consideration 
when setting CAA § 109!!2!! national ambient air quality standards.!!24 
D. Implications for Takings 
This section explores the implications of the Quartet for the issue 
of governmental takings. In some instances, the implications are di-
rect. In others, they are more inferential. It should be noted at this 
point that the Fifth Amendment!!25 Takings Clause!!26 is made applica-
ble to the states only through the Fourteenth Amendment.!!2? 
Seminole Thbe clearly states that the Eleventh Amendment acts to 
modifY judicial power within the ambit of Article III of the Constitu-
tion.!!28 Without more, this would have effectively eviscerated the "just 
compensation" part of the Takings Clause because it is well established 
that access to a state's treasury is a critical factor in triggering the 
§O See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994). 
321 SeeFluridaPrepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2215 (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
5!2 See id. at 2207-09. This is akin to a comt reviewing a law clerk's legal memorandum 
to determine if the court below had an adequate basis. 
m 42 U.S.C. § 7409. 
524 Although this section has focused on the central provision of the CAA, it should be 
obvious that this new rule is available to challenge any statutory provision. The issue is not 
whether Congress acted within its constitutional parameters but whether it had an ade-
quate basis for its decision. 
m U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
526 The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
5'¥1 See Chicago, Bmlington Be Quincy RR Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) 
(incorporating the Fifth Amendment via the Due Process Clause of the Fomteenth 
Amendment); see also Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1923, 1930 (1998); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994). 
S!8 See Seminole Tribe III, 517 U.S. at 65,73. 
230 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:193 
Eleventh Amendment bar.s29 The crucial addition is the incorporation 
via the Fourteenth Amendment which the Court held modifies the 
Eleventh Amendment bar.MO The Court, however, spoke of congres-
sional power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment shield pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5. Thus, unless Congress has 
acted through statute to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court,SSl to enforce the Takings Clause, then 
the federal courts may be without jurisdiction. A statute must explic-
itly seek to utilize the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5, assuming 
that it has a valid basis in Section 1, in order to confer jurisdiction on 
the federal courts. SS2 The question becomes whether the jurisdictional 
statutes make the waiver explicit. The author finds none that make 
such a waiver. 
Assuming that the jurisdictional statutes do make an explicit 
waiver, the test propounded by Flmida Prepaid comes into play. The 
hearing records must demonstrate that states are engaging in nefari-
ous activity at the time the statute is enacted in order for it to be a 
valid enactment pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.m Addi-
tionally, states must provide either no remedy or only inadequate 
remedies in order for Congress to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment 
as the basis for legislative action. SM Alden propounds the existence of a 
residual state sovereignty unless limited by the Constitution.SM The 
extent of this state sovereignty is unclear beyond the facts of Alden, 
but it appears that the Court intended it to extend beyond the facts of 
the decision. 
Nollan v. California Coastal CommissitJnSS6 is a reasonable point at 
which to begin. The Constitution of California provides as follows: 
A. 
No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or 
possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, 
estuary, or other navigable water in this State, shall be per-
329 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 117 S. Ct. 900, 905 (1997); supra Section II, 
SSG SeminolB llibe Ill, 517 U.S. at 59. 
»1 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1255 (1994); if. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1868). 
In this case, Congress validly withdrew jurisdiction from the Supreme Court while it was 
considering a writ of habeas corpus action. See id. The Court also stated that, "[w]e are not 
at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature." Id. at 514. 
SS2 See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2205; College Sav. Bank Ill, 119 S. Ct. at 2223. 
5SS See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2206. 
534 See id. at 2208. 
3SS See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2246-47. 
536 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
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mitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it 
is required for any public purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct 
the free navigation of such water; and the Legislature shall 
enact such laws as will give the most liberal construction to 
this provision, so that access to navigable waters of this State 
shall always be attainable for the people thereof. m 
231 
Although the Court found this provision unavailing,338 the question to 
be asked is to what extent Alden may have altered it. It appears logical 
that to determine the nature of state sovereignty one should look to a 
state's constitution, and it may be possible to assert that California's 
constitution reserves certain "rights" over land analogous to the 
dominant navigational servitude enjoyed by the federal govern-
ment.S59 This would be consistent with the concurrent sovereignty 
doctrine propounded in Alden. 
It may be asserted that in 1879 California established a dominant 
servitude as part of its residual sovereignty. Although the owner of the 
land at that time may have had a claim for compensation, it is reason-
able to assert that the subsequent purchasers took title subject to that 
servitude.340 It is to be presumed that the California legislature acted 
pursuant to its constitution. IT retaining servitudes upon land is not 
an Alden attribute of sovereignty, then it is difficult to imagine what 
else this doctrine contains. Thus, an implementing statute enacted 
pursuant to a state's constitutional provision which retains a servitude 
cannot be a taking.541 Whether the Court will accept the logical exten-
sion of Alden is another matter. 
In Nollan, the Court characterized the action as "permanent 
physical occupation."542 The question arises whether it is not better 
characterized as a restriction on use in that the state "took" part of the 
use of the asset. Under this formulation, the question arises as to 
537Id. at 847-48. The provision was adopted in 1879. See id. at 847. 
S38 See id. at 832. 
ssg See U.S. v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967); Federal Power Comm'n v. Niagara Mo-
hawk Power Co., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954). The exercise of this servitude does not invade 
any protected property right. See Rands, 389 U.S. at 123. 
S40 A subsequent purchaser should pay less for the property because it is subject to the 
dominant servitude, and thus have no claim for a taking even if the servitude is not as-
serted for years. 
HI Cf. U.S. v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700 (1987). In this case, the exercise of the 
dominant navigational servitude, which effectively destroyed the "property interests" of the 
complainant, was not found to be a taking even though the assertion of the servitude had 
lain dormant for years. See id. at 708. 
M2 483 U.S. at 833. 
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whether there is now property being taken after the decision in College 
Savings. In College Savings, the Court held that the activity of using an 
asset, which was conceded to be property, to do business and make a 
profit was not a protected property interest implicating the Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause.343 In Florida Prepaid, the 
Court found that a state interfering with the right to exclude others 
did not by itself violate the Fourteenth Amendment.344 Thus, if the 
purported taking is the deprivation of the use of an asset, then under 
the logic of College Savings there can be no proscribed taking. It is 
conceded that the property at issue in Nollan was realty and that in 
College Savings it was not, but where is the logical distinction after East-
ern Enterprises v. Apfel?345 It should be further noted that in both Not-
lan and College Savings the deprivation of use was present as well as 
future and not based upon retroactive conduct. It is not clear from 
College Savings how much use the complainant lost. 
In a recent federal district court decision, a plaintiff filed an ac-
tion against a village alleging a taking and against the state as required 
by state statute.346 A platted, but unconstructed, street passed by plain-
tiffs property to a lake and provided, evidently, considerable public 
access.347 A state official was made a defendant to the suit as required 
by state law.348 The gravamen of the relief sought was prospective in 
nature.349 The court, in dismissing the state and state official as de-
fendants, found that the Eleventh Amendment barred the action and 
that Ex parte Young did not apply because of the "special sovereignty 
interest" at issue.35o The entire action was ultimately dismissed, but it 
is not clear whether the action against the village failed because the 
state was an indispensable party.351 Applying the foregoing analysis to 
343 See College Sav. Bank Ill, 119 S. Ct. at 2225. 
S44 See Flmida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2208. 
343 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998). A plurality found an economic taking. See Whalin, supra 
note 294, at 701. Colkge Savings Bank m also undermines the rationale of this decision 
because the deprivation found by the plurality was money from doing business based upon 
past activity. See 118 S. Ct. at 2149. The distinction may be that in Colkge Savings Bank III, 
the economic injury was caused by reasonably present and future conduct, but, on the 
other hand, the money "being taken" from Eastern Enterprises was present and future 
revenues. See id. 
346 See MacDonald v. Village of Northport, 164 F.3d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1999). 
S47 See id. at 966-67. 
346 See id. at 970-71. 
S49 See id. 
S50 Id. at 972-73. 
551 See MacJ)(maJd, 164 F.3d at 973. This circuit subsequently found that an action against state 
officials in their official capacities could go forward under the Ex parte Young exception 
when the state officials were acting under federal statutory delegated authority. See Michi-
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Tigard and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Counci4552 it may be possible 
to question their continued vitality as well. 
E. Delegated Authority and Citizens' Suits 
This part will examine to what extent the Quartet has altered the 
ability of a citizen to sue a state pursuant to citizens' suit provisions in 
federal law, as well as the ability to sue a state, or arm of a state, when 
a permittee has a dispute with such an entity operating a federal pro-
gram under delegated authority. Numerous federal environmental 
statutes allow a state to administer the federal program upon agreeing 
to specified conditions.55s Many of the same statutes also contain 
specific provisions for citizens' suits554 but many also condition them 
on not waiving whatever Eleventh Amendment bar may be avail-
able.555 
gao Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., No. 98-1315,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17729, at *15 (6th 
Cir. July 28, 1999). The court based its conclusion on Alden. See id. at *14. The author must 
question this decision because the FLSA plaintiffs were also seeking prospective relief, and 
the Sixth Circuit's decision specifically ignored Co~ Savings Bank ms explicit rejection 
of constructive waiver where the plaintiffs were also seeking prospective relief. See Alden v. 
Maine, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998). The continued vitality of this July 28, 1999, decision 
in Michigan BeU is doubtful because the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the Seventh Circuit's 
decision in MCI Telecommunications Cmp. u IUinois Commerce Commission. See Michigan Bell, 
No. 98-1315,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17729, at *9 & *15-*18 (citing 168 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 
1999». The problem with this reliance is that the Seventh Circuit on June 25, 1999, va-
cated the denial ofrehearing of June 23,1999, granted a rehearing and set oral argument 
for September, 1999, with supplemental briefing on the issue of the applicability of Alden, 
Co~ Savings Bank Ill, and Fimida Prepaid. See MCI v. ICC, No. 98-2127, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14213, at *1 (7th Cir.June 25,1999). Thus, the Sixth Circuit cited as precedent a 
decision which had been vacated 33 days previously. See id. 
sst 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
555 See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, & Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 
§ 136(t)-136(v), 136(w-l) (1994); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. § 2627 
(1994); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. § 1379 (1994); En-
dangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (1994); Nonindigenous Aquatic Nuisance 
Prevention and Control Act (NANPCA), 16 U.S.C. § 4724 (1994); Surface Mining Control 
& Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1235, 1253-1255 (1994); CWA, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g)(l) (1994); Public Health Service Act (PHSA) , 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 300g-2, 300h-300h-8 (1994); Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6926-
6929, 6931-6933, 6941-6948 (1994); CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410-7411, 7424, 7428, 7661a 
(1994); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(c)(3)&(d), 9621(f) (1994). 
554 See Courtney E. Flora, Comment, An Inapt Fiction: The Use of the Ex parte Young Doc-
trine fur Environmental Citiuns Suits Against States after Seminole Tribe, 27 Nw. ENvn.. L. 935 
(1997) (providing a pre-June, 1999, analysis). 
555 See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1994) (Eleventh Amendment not abrogated); 
ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994) (Eleventh Amendment not abrogated); SMCRA, 30 
U.S.C. § 1270 (1994) (Eleventh Amendment not abrogated); CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 
(1994) (Eleventh Amendment not abrogated); Marine Protection, Research, & Sanctuaries 
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One commentator has questioned whether delegation may be 
conditioned upon a state, in effect, volunteering to waive its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.S56If delegation may be analogized to a "gratu-
ity, " in that the federal government will conduct enforcement if a state 
does not seek delegation, then it would seem to meet the parameters 
of Colkge Savin~ which, admittedly in dicta, noted with approval con-
gressional conditioning of an interstate compact upon a state's agree-
ing to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity.SlS7 The Court did not, 
however, view this as coercive even though a state cannot enter into a 
compact without congressional approval.M8 The non-coercive argu-
ment for such requirements would appear to be enhanced as a result 
of the numerous specific declarations of non-abrogation previously 
noted. SlS9 The credence given to this dicta is somewhat mitigated when 
one recalls that Seminole Tribe seemingly approved constructive waiver 
Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (1994) (Eleventh Amendment not abrogated); 
Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), 42 U.S.C. § 300 U)-8 (1994) (Eleventh 
Amendment not abrogated); Noise Control Act of 1972 (NCA), 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (1994) 
(Eleventh Amendment not abrogated); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6072 (1994) (Eleventh 
Amendment not abrogated); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (Eleventh Amendment not 
abrogated); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1994) (Eleventh Amendment not abrogated); 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10139,10201 (1994); Emergency 
Planning Be Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(l) 
(1994). 
S56 See Alfred R. light, He lWw Pays the Piper ShmJ,1d Cau the Thne: Dual Swereignty in U.S. 
Environmental Law, 41HE ENvn.. LAWYER 779,808-13 (1998). 
557 See College Sav. Bank III, 119 S. Ct. at 2231. New Star Lasers u &gents of the University of 
California, No. Civ. S-99-428, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13411 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1999), 
found an acceptance of a gratuity waiver where the entity filed for a patent and thereby 
accepted the benefits of patent ownership as well as the detriment of a challenge in federal 
court to that patent's validity. See id. at *9-*11. This court held that this was not an "other-
wise lawful activity" which gave rise to the now overruled constructive waiver doctrine. See 
id. at *6-*7. The vitality of this decision must be questioned because there is no indication 
that the state entity affirmatively and explicitly accepted a waiver as a condition of receiv-
ing a patent. See id. 
55SSeeid. 
359 See note 355 and accompanying text. Some support for this assertion is found by 
the recent decision of In re Innes, No. 97-3363, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20059 (10th Cir. 
Aug. 24, 1999). This was an adversarial bankruptcy case in which a state university partici-
pated in the Perkins Loan Program in a "contract" with the U.S. Department of Education 
which required the university to defend dischargeability claims. See id. at *1, *4. Abroga-
tion was not an issue. See id. at *6. The court first found that Kansas had not expressly 
waived its immunity by its constitution or by statute. See id. at *9. The court then examined 
whether a state may waive its immunity by "affirmative conduct in the context of a federal 
program" and then found that when a state operates a program under delegated authority 
it may contractually waive its immunity. See id. at *9, *14-*15. The remaining issue was 
whether Kansas law precluded the consummation of such a contract by the state entity, 
and the court found no such preclusion. See id. at *26. 
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in dicta. ~ College Savings has ended any assertion that when a state, or 
an arm of a state, participates in a federally regulated activity it has 
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity361 subject to the 
qualification for specific waiver noted above. The question now to be 
addressed is whether a state, or an arm of a state, may be sued absent 
express consent. 
One preliminary matter should be addressed. Middlesex County 
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n362 concerned an action 
alleging implied causes of action under the CWA, MPRSA363 and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.364 The Court found no implied remedy under the CWA 
or MPRSA based upon the extensive remedial scheme.365 The Court 
also found that the extensive remedial scheme under both statutes 
precluded an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.366 It should be re-
membered that Seminole Tribe specifically excluded an action pursuant 
to Ex parte Young because the statute at issue had an extensive reme-
dial scheme even though it had just found it unconstitutional. 367 Even 
3EO See Seminole Tribe Ill, 517 U.S. at 66. The Eighth Circuit recently explored this in 
Bradley u Arkansas Department of Education in the context of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA). See No. 98-1010, 1999 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 20831, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 1999). The court held that IDEA validly abrogated a 
state's immunity. See id. at *3-*4. It also held, however, that IDEA was invalid as not appro-
priate because "Congress did not adequately identify the constitutional transgressions it 
sought to remedy.~ Id. at *13. In dicta, the court went on to find that IDEA exceeded Con-
gress' Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers. See id. at *17. The court did hold that 
there was an explicit contractual waiver of immunity for IDEA claims by the state's partici-
pation in IDEA. See id. at *20. The court then found that the RA was not appropriate be-
cause it sought to protect statutory rights rather than constitutional rights. See id. at *29-
*30. The court then found the receipt of federal funds contractual waiver of RA was invalid 
because the waiver was overly broad and proscribed coercion. See id. at *34-*35. This court 
did not, however, examine whether the state's waiver of IDEA was valid under that state's 
law in contrast to In reInnes. SeeNo. 97-3363,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20059, at *9, *14-*15. 
361 See Col/egt Sau Bank m, 119 S. Ct. at 2233. 
362 453 U.S. 1 (1981). 
36S 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1421 (1994); Clammers, 453 U.S. at 4. 
364 See Clammers, 453 U.S. at 19. 
365 See id. at 18. 
366 See id. at 21; see also Garcia v. Cecos Int'l, Inc., 761 F.2d 76, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1985) 
(finding that RCRA foreclosed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim); Adams v. Republic Steel Corp., 
621 F. Supp. 370, 376 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding TSCA precluded 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims); Reeger v. Mill Serv., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 1266, 1268 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (finding that 
RCRA and CAA precluded 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims); cf. Ann M. Lininger, Narrowing the 
Preemptive Scape of the Clean Water Act as a Means of Enhancing Environmental Protection, 20 
HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 165 (1996); Demian Schane, Note, Keeping the Citizens Out: How Vir-
ginia Has Manipulated the Mandate of the Clean Water Act, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y 
REv. 457 (1997); Timothy J. Sullivan, Note, RCRA and the Recovery of Past Clean-Up Costs: 
Meghrigu KFC Western, Inc., 8VILL. ENvrL. LJ. 627 (1997). 
367 See Seminole Tribe m, 517 U.S. 44, 73-74 (1996). 
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if the remedial scheme is more modest, the use of Ex parte Young may 
be precluded.368 If an environmental statute has been found to pre-
clude a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim under Clammers, then it is no stretch to 
assert that an Ex parte Young action is also precluded under the Quar-
tet. In each of the Quartet cases the plaintiffwas also seeking prospec-
tive relief in the form of an order requiring the state entity to obey a 
valid federal statutory right, and the Court precluded prospective re-
lief in each instance.!l69 
A recent decision based solely on Seminole Tribe is instructive.37o 
The plaintiff brought an action against EPA and the state agency 
which operated the CWA § 404 program under delegated authority.371 
The court found that there was no abrogation of the Eleventh 
Amendment by the CWA,372 and that the action could not be main-
tained under the Ex parte Young exception.373 In another action alleg-
ing that a state was a CWA polluter,374 the Ex parte Young exception was 
found to be available based upon the inference regarding CWA citi-
zens' suits found in a footnote in Seminole Tribe.375 In another decision 
alleging that a state was a CWA, RCRA and CERClA polluter, a citizen 
suit was found barred by the Eleventh Amendment when state 
officials were sued in their official capacities. 376 
Absent express consent, it appears that the federal court door is 
closed, leaving plaintiffs only the alternative of an action against the 
368 See id. at 75. 
368 Cf. Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, No. 97-1825, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16945 (8th 
Cir. en bancJuly 23, 1999). The Eighth Circuit, under the Quartet, dismissed against a 
state entity and its officials a Title II, American with Disabilities Act claim as not being a 
proper exercise of congressional Fourteenth Amendment section five power (Equal Pro-
tection Clause enforcement). See id. at *28. The court also dismissed a related 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claim because of the extensive federal statutory remedial scheme, even though it 
had already stated that statutory remedies were unavailable. See id. at *34. A contrary deci-
sion on the same question was reached in Martin v. Kansas. See Nos. 98-3102, 98-3118, 
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19707 (10th Cir. Aug. 19, 1999). 
570 See Michigan Peat v. EPA, 175 F.3d 422, 428 (6th Cir. 1999); Rowlands v. Pointe 
Mouille Shooting Club, No. 98-1514, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16372 (6th Cir.July 14, 1999) 
(reaching same result under RCRA). 
371 See Michigan Peat, 175 F.3d at 424. 
372 See id. at 428. 
373 See id. 
374 See Froebel v. Meyer,13 F. Supp. 2d 843, 844-45 (E.D. Wis. 1998). 
375 See id. at 853-54 (citing Seminole Tribe III, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17). The author must 
question whether this survives the repudiation of constructive waiver in College Savings 
BankllL 
376 Burnette v. Rowland, Nos. 3:94-CV-00420, -{)0676, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11710, 
*8-*9 (D. Conn. May 4, 1998), aff'd sub nom. Burnette v. Carothers, Nos. 98-7835 (L), 98-
9003 (CON), 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 22277 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1999). 
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federal government, in most instances the EPA. The gravamen of such 
a claim would be that the federal agency did not ensure that the state 
operating under delegated authority properly fulfilled its duties, but 
such a suit would be fraught with difficulties.377 
There may be one window which is open at least for a time. In 
United States ex reI. Stevens v. Vermont Agmcy of Natural Resources,'!178 an 
employee filed an action alleging that the state agency falsified claims 
for grants to operate federal programs under delegated authority. '!179 
The action was brought on behalf of the United States under the fed-
eral False Claims Act.'!18O Upon an examination of the legislative his-
tory, the court found that a state was a person within the ambit of the 
act. '!181 Vermont then challenged the jurisdiction of the court by assert-
ing the Eleventh Amendment as a bar.'!182 The court found that the 
real party in interest in a False Claims Act case is the United States, 
which has the option of intervening, taking over the case, and then 
either dismissing it or proceeding forward. '!18'!1 Since the action is in 
legal reality between the United States and a state, the Eleventh 
Amendment does not apply.384 The Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari to this case, however, leaving the continued vitality of this avenue 
in doubt. 
If the Court does uphold this action, then a new avenue for one 
aggrieved by a state's operation of a statute under delegated authority 
is available. If it is possible to demonstrate that a state is not fulfilling 
its duties under its delegated authority by properly enforcing the law, 
then it may be possible to sue under the False Claims Act alleging that 
the state filed a false claim in seeking funds to administer the law at 
577 See, e.g., American Canoe Ass'n v. EPA, 46 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
578 162 F.3d 195 (2nd Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999) (presenting the 
following questions to the Court: "(1) Whether a state is a "person" subject to liability un-
der 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) of the False Claims Act?; and (2) Whether the Eleventh Amend-
ment precludes a private relator from commencing and prosecuting a False Claims Act suit 
against an unconsenting state"). On November 19, 1999, the following question was added 
to the two listed directly above: "Does a private person have standing under Article III to 
litigate claims of fraud upon the government?" See Supreme Court Collection at 
<http://supct.law.comell.edu/ supt/html/111999.ZRhtml>. 
579 See id. at 198. 
580 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994); Stevens, 162 F.3d at 198. 
581 See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 207; acccm1, United States ex reI. Garibaldi v. Orleans Parish 
Sch. Bd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558-59 (E.D. La. 1999) (noting that there are splits among 
the circuits on this issue). 
58! See Stevens, 162 F.3d at 199. 
585 See id. at 201. 
584 See id. at 202. A contrary conclusion was reached in United States ex reI. Foulds v. 
Texas Tech University. See 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999). 
238 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:193 
issue because it was not properly enforcing that law under its dele-
gated authority. According to Stevens, the Eleventh Amendment bar 
will not apply because the action is being brought by the United 
States.385 
CONCLUSION 
The Calhounian Quartet will almost certainly have a significant 
impact upon environmental law and this article is intended only to 
begin the discussion. The immediate major adverse impact is in the 
area of intellectual property which is the cornerstone of current 
American economic growth and the "industry" which will be the cen-
ter of economic growth in the new century.!186 An enforceable system 
of intellectual property rights is key to a nation's effectiveness in the 
new economy.lIS7 This potential negative economic impact caused the 
author to forecast, incorrectly as it turned out, lI88 that the Court would 
step back from the economic precipice and limit, or overturn, Semi-
nole Tribe. Reversal of the Civil War was not anticipated. 
The sweeping restructuring of the constitutional structure repre-
sented by the Quartet is probably not at an end. The Court has 
granted certiorari to three cases which will provide the opportunity to 
either extend the sweep, or to pull back.lI89 What seemed farfetched 
585 See Fuulds, 171 F.3d at 294. 
386 See gmerally LESTER C. THUROW, Bun.nING WEALTH: THE NEW RULES FOR INDI-
VIDUALS, CoMPANIES, AND NATIONS IN A KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (1999). 
587 Seeid. at 116-25, 261-62. 
386 The author was not alone. See John T. Cross, Intelkctual Property and the Eleventh 
AmendmentA.fterSeminole Tribe, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 519, 522-23 (1998). 
589 SeeRenov. Condon, 119 S. Ct. 1753 (1999). The question presented to the Court in 
Condon is whether the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725, 
contravenes constitutional principles of federalism. See Supreme Court Collection at 
<http://supct.1aw.comell.edu/supct/oct99qp.htm>; Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 119 
S. Ct. 901 (1999). The question presented to the Court in Kimel is whether the Eleventh 
Amendment bars a private suit in federal court against a state for violation of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act. See Supreme Court Collection, supra this note; United 
States v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 119 S. Ct. 902 (1999). The questions presented to the 
Court in this case are: 
(1) Whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. 
§ 621 et seq., contains a clear abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit by individuals; and (2) Whether the extension of the Age 
Discrimination in employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., to the 
States was a proper exercise of Congress' power under section five of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby constituting a valid exercise of congres-
sional power to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit by individuals. 
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one year ago is the new reality, at least for as long as current majority 
holds. 
Where a state, or an arm of a state, has aggrieved a private party 
and violated federally-created statutory rights, there is likely to be no 
remedy (assuming that there is no consent to be sued) if the relief 
sought is retroactive and impacts a state's treasury. In the instance of 
prospective relief, it appears likely that there is also no remedy. It 
should be remembered that in each of the Quartet, prospective relief 
was sought to keep a state from violating valid federally created statu-
tory rights, and prospective relief was denied in each instance. 
Just as Clammers stands for the proposition that 42 U .S.C. § 1983 
is not available for environmental suits where the statute provides an 
extensive remedial scheme,S90 the Quartet holds that the existence of 
a comprehensive remedial scheme, even if it is unavailable to the ag-
grieved party because of the Eleventh Amendment, precludes Ex parte 
Young remedies. Since all of the federal environmental statutes allow 
the United States the discretion to bring an action against a state en-
tity for enforcement, the existence, at least in theory, of this remedy 
should preclude the use of Ex parte Young. Since the federal govern-
ment does not, and will not, have unlimited prosecutorial resources, it 
will use its discretion to select which actions to bring. These policy 
choices will reflect the viewpoint of the administration in power. 
Whether these choices will reflect the priorities of the aggrieved pri-
vate party is quite another matter. 
The rewriting of property law, assuming that the Court in College 
Savings meant what it said, to exclude the use of property from the 
ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause under-
mines several previous takings decisions. If destroying the use is not 
within the ambit, then states are now free to regulate uses without be-
ing concerned with a takings claim. States also have a second arrow in 
their quiver because the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1255, does 
not abrogate of the Eleventh Amendment, explicitly or otherwise, and 
the Quartet clearly states that Article III is modified by the Eleventh 
Amendment. This would preclude the Court from granting certiorari 
to review such a decision of a state's highest court, again assuming the 
Court meant what it said in the Quartet, until Congress enacts an ex-
plicit abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment pursuant to sufficient 
Supreme Court Collection, supra this note; see also Stephen J. Wermeil, Fall Doiket Already 
PmentsA Wide Variety of Hot-Button Issues, LEGAL TlMEs,July 12,1999, at S35. 
!190 See Clammers, 453 U.S. at 21. The preclusive nature of the Quartet may lead to fur-
ther expansion of Clammers. See id. 
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evidence of protected Fourteenth Amendment violations. It is un-
likely that Nollan, Lucas, and Tigard could now even reach the Su-
preme Court until the statutory infirmity is removed. 
Potentially even more problematic is the new standard of judicial 
review set forth in Florida Prepaid. Although any legislative action at 
issue will be examined to determine if it is within the ambit of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it does not use any of the traditional code-
words--i.e., strict scrutiny, rational basis, etc.lI91 Thus, it is not unrea-
sonable to conclude that the statute will be examined under general 
"rules." It should be remembered that in Florida Prepaid, the Court 
found the statute at issue to be within the parameters of congressional 
power, but the infirmity was that Congress did not have sufficient evi-
dence, according to the majority, at the time it made its judgement to 
make the judgement it did. It is one matter to ask what Congress (or 
any other legislative body, for that matter) did in order to determine 
if it fits within Constitutional parameters; it is quite another to ask why 
and how Congress made its decision in order to determine if Con-
gress had sufficient evidence to make its decision and if it was "appro-
priate." The Court did not explicate an evidentiary standard for re-
view-i.e., substantial evidence, preponderance of the evidence, etc.-
so one is sailing on uncharted seas without a compass, much less a 
global positioning system. 
This standard may provide the federal courts with a hunting li-
cense to challenge all environmental statutes to determine whether 
the evidence at the time they were enacted supported the legislation 
Congress made and the Executive signed. Several of the core ele-
ments of major environmental statutes were enacted more than 
twenty years ago. The standard the majority would apply is not the 
knowledge gained during the past twenty plus years but the evidence 
at the time the decision was made. Although the Clean Air Act was the 
primary focus of this Article's examination, the same analysis applies 
to any of the federal environmental statutes. In the author's opinion, 
391 For recent discussions of various scrutinies in various contexts see the following: 
Keith E. Sealing, The Myth of a Color-Blind Constitution, 54 WASH. U.]. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 
157 (1998); Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of judicial 
Technique, 108 YALE LJ. 439 (1998); Jason M. Skaggs, Comment, justifYing Gender-Based 
Affirmative Action under United States 'U Virginia's "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification· Standard, 
86 CAL. L. REv. 1169 (1998); Montgomery L. Wilson, Comment, Congress Imposes an "Undue 
Burden· in Poor Families: How the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act's FulJ.Family Cut-Off WiU Force 
Parents to Separatejrom Children, 81EMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REv. 141 (1998). 
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this amounts to a thinly-veiled usurpation of the Separation of Powers 
doctrine. 
This Article has considered the impact of state sovereign immu-
nity upon the CWA and other federal environmental protection stat-
utes, and concludes that the ethereal doctrine of state sovereignty 
enunciated in Alden may serve as a basis to limit the jurisdictional 
reach of federal environmental statutes. As the United States enters 
the twenty-first century as the dominant economic, political, and mili-
tary nation, one may well ponder why a Supreme Court majority has 
chosen to leap into the eighteenth century instead. 
ADDENDUM 
On January 11, 2000, the Supreme Court further ratified the 
Calhounian Quartet in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,392 a decision 
regarding whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967, as amended,393 validly abrogated a state's sovereign immunity. 
Although some of the plaintiffs sought prospective relief,394 there ap-
pears to be no indication that the Court considered whether the rem-
edy of Ex Parte Young was available. Instead, the Court specifically 
cited state age discrimination statutes in a footnote,395 leading to the 
inference that since other remedies are available, the Ex Parte Young 
remedy is not. The Court reiterated the amorphous concurrent 
soverignty doctrine, but placed it this time within the penumbra of 
the Eleventh Amendment,396 finding that there was a sufficiently ex-
plicit Congressional intent to abrogate from defining employers as 
including "public agencies. "397 
The fundamental issue in Kimel was whether there was a valid 
Congressional abrogation of immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.398 Using the test applied in Florida Prepaid,399 
392 2000 u.s. LEXIS 498 (January 11, 2000) [hereinafter KimelJ. 
593 26 U.S.C. §§ 621~34 (1994) (ADEA). 
594 See Kimel at *14. 
595 See id. at *54 n.l. 
596 See id. at *20. 
397 fd. at **21-22. All of the Justices joined in this conclusion save Justices Thomas 
and Kennedy. See id. at **~9, 62, 67~8. 
598 See id. at *33. 
399 See Kimel at **37-38. 
242 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 27:193 
the Court held that the ADEA was not such a valid abrogation.400 The 
Court next held that age classifications did not implicate special 
Equal Protection concerns and were subject only to rational relation-
ship review.401 The Court then examined '\vhy Congress acted" to de-
termine if it had sufficient evidence to reach its legislative conclu-
sion,402 and made the evidentiary "ruling" that Congress had 
insufficient evidence of nefarious activity by states.40S 
As has been discussed in this article, and as in the previous Cal-
hounian Quartet cases, the Court in Kimel left the statutory rights cre-
ated by the ADEA intact, but precluded private party remedy.404 It 
should be noted that the ultimate basis of the decision was somewhat 
confused-the Court stated both that the ADEA is not a valid exercise 
of Congressional Article I power,405 and that the abrogation of state 
sovereignty through imposition of a private party remedy is invalid.406 
Nevertheless, the decision in Kimel largely reinforces the analysis and 
conclusions of this article. 
400 See id. at *38. 
4.01 See it!. at **38-40. It must be noted that the Court stated, although in dicta, that 
only race and gender classifications implicate special Equal Protection scrutiny-national 
origin and religious affiliation were not mentioned. See it!. at **38-39. 
402 Id. at **49-52. 
4.05 Id. at *53. 
404 See Kimel at *53. 
4.05 See it!. 
4.06 See it!. This issue was even further clouded by the Court's citation of remedies sup-
plied by state statutes, implying that there are no Federal rights available at all. See it!. 
